



International Labour Organization

IPEC International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour

IPEC Evaluation

**“Progressive Eradication of Child
Labor in the Commercial Agriculture
Sector in Central America and the
Dominican Republic”**

Phase I

(RLA/00/P54/USA)

P2608200050

**Update of an independent final evaluation by a
team of external consultants**

October 2005

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.

The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants*. The field mission took place in October 2005. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such do not constitute the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

Funding for this project evaluation was provided by the United States Department of Labor. This report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Department of Labor nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Project of Eradication of Child Labour in Commercial Agriculture in Central America and the Dominican Republic was successful and effective. It obtained most of the anticipated results in the development objective and the immediate objectives. Regarding the quantitative aspect, several results surpassed the forecasts of the design and it also obtained a better quality in effects and products, specially in the programs of education and awareness raising.
2. The Project was implemented between October 2000 and September 2005. It was integrated with a sub regional project, responsible for the general coordination and some activities at the subregional level, and four national projects in Guatemala (Broccoli in Chilascó), Honduras (Melon in Marcovia), Dominican Republic (Tomato in Azua) and Nicaragua (Crops in Chontales), in charge of direct actions. The budget in the design was US\$ 5,1 million¹, of which US\$ 4, 3 million were a contribution of the Department of Labour of the United States of America (USDOL).
3. The Target Group of the national projects of Guatemala, Honduras and Dominican Republic² was 9,543 working boys, girls, adolescents³ and 1.050 families of these children. The actions of the Project in favor of the Objective Group were concentrated in awareness raising and measures of social protection, in areas of education, health and generation of income. At a sub regional level technical studies were carried out about the gravity and dimension of child labour in commercial agriculture, to enable and to raise awareness in Governments, supervisory organizations and workers unions.
4. The results obtained by the three national projects are summarized as follows:

Objective / Indicator	Goal	Result	
		n°	%
<u>Developing Objective</u>			
Prevented and Withdrawn children (n°)	9,543	11,181	117%
- Withdrawn (n°)	2,745	3,019	110%
- Prevented (n°)	7,583	9,141	121%
<u>Education</u>			
Children enrolled in Schools (n°)	3,300	3,176	96%
School failure (%)	7%	3%	206%
Adolescents with occupational training (n°)	325	336	103%
<u>Health</u>			
Boys, Girls and Adolescents (n°)	8,720	8,452	97%
Families (n°)	750	1,333	178%
<u>Alternative Income Generation</u>			
- Training (people)	1,050	1,009	96%
- Credit (people)	n/a	259	25%

5. On the other hand, the sub regional project managed to spot the hidden dimension and seriousness of child labour in commercial agriculture sector in the sub region. To achieve this, studies, graphics and mass communication with multimedia and activities for awareness raising were made both in the public and private sector in the three countries.
6. The reasons for these satisfactory results were essentially two: the good performance of the coordination of the sub regional project and the national projects, and a favorable environment, whose elements were the advances made on the Treaty of Free Commerce (DR-

¹ The budget of the national projects in Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic and a portion of the subregional project was US\$ 4,0 million

² This evaluation did not cover the national project in Nicaragua where the evaluation was completed in September 2003.

³ The design had planned for 8,500 boys, girls and adolescents but during the design of the action programs the target group resulted to be more numerous.

CAFTA) and the outstanding increase of social investment in some countries like Guatemala. There were also some unfavorable elements in the environment, like the stagnation of the economy in the sub region and the crisis of the coffee prices.

7. The obtained results are partially sustainable, since only some components of the sustainability were reached: a) The awareness raising mobilization in the areas of intervention has been, without any doubt, one of the best results of the Project. It assures at least that those communities will maintain a vigilant attitude to prevent and eradicate child labor at least as a medium term goal; b) The public and private institutions of the countries were not involved in operational aspects of the Project, which has limited the institutional learning to continue taking care of aspects such as education, health, fight towards poverty and awareness raising in the sector of commercial agriculture; c) The limited success of the programs of income generation has not allowed a significant amount of families to surpass its condition of poverty, which partly originated child labour; d) Three synergies⁴ obtained will assure the continuity of some social action programs in Guatemala, Honduras and Dominican Republic; nevertheless, these did not evolve from a common exit strategy by all the participants, but were the result of the Project coordinators.
8. The efficiency of the Project was low, not only the one anticipated in the design (47%)⁵, but also the one in the implementation (40%)⁶. The reasons that determined this were three: a) Unfortunate selection of three implementing agencies that did complete their action programs and had to be replaced; b) delays in the approval of action programs, that caused delays in their start and the period of implementation for the Project, which was duplicated, instead of the planned 24 to 30 months, to 60 months; and c) The financial contributions from Governments and other associates to the Project, planned in the design, were reduced approximately to half.
9. The Project had strengths and weaknesses regarding the design and implementation that constitute lessons for future projects, for IPEC and the Governments of Central America and Dominican Republic.

Strengths

10. Making child labour visible in the sub region: Child Labour in commercial agriculture in Central America and Dominican Republic was not considered as a problem, because it was hidden, diminished and its existence even neglected. The main reason was that part-time work in family was considered as "instructive work" to transmit the family culture. In addition to this, it was also a way to maximize family income. Nevertheless, several actions of the Project contributed to remarkably raise awareness, mainly through forums and workshops, the involvement of the Project in public media and publications, and the distribution of documents on the risks and negative effects of child labour.
11. Withdrawal and Prevention of child labour: The excellent results on the withdrawal of child labour in the areas of intervention demonstrate that the measures of social protection and awareness raising actions were carried out pertinently. It also demonstrated to the public and private institutions of the countries, that the projects that implement actions in a uniform sector are more efficient to eradicate child labour, compared to national programmes.
12. Relevance of the Extension of the Project: The effects obtained between August 2003 and August 2005 completely justify the extension of the Project, because otherwise it would had not been possible to complete its mission nor to fulfill great part of the objectives. It allows to extract a lesson with respect to the future duration of a project, since the design will have to estimate adequately the required times to produce the desired results, putting special attention to the programs of income generation and education, specially when the latter are oriented to modify education methods.

⁴ Actions of income generation in Honduras, public scholarships for education in Guatemala and integral actions in the Dominican Republic.

⁵ U\$S 1.15 of expenses for each inverted dollar in the Target Group

⁶ U\$S 1.50 of expenses for each inverted dollar in the Target Group

13. Local Social Mobilization: The actions of awareness raising of the Project gave origin to excellent processes of local social mobilization to eradicate child labour, to enroll children in schools and to support the actions of the Project. These processes also gave origin to committees of parents, mothers and teachers who assumed the monitoring of child labour to detect new children at risk of working. In addition they would detect the children who did not attend school and raise awareness in their families.
14. Participation of Employers and Workers: The withdrawal and the prevention of child labour in Marcovia would not have been possible without the determined participation of the employers in the Honduran Council for Private Enterprises, who had to invest human resources in their offices to raise awareness and to enable parents, contractors, trainers and technicians. In Ázua the evaluation highlights the determined participation of the Dominican Association of Professors and of the Federation that joints small agriculturists, who were decisive in raising awareness amongst their associates. It confirms the usefulness of integrating employers and workers in projects and in management instances.
15. Education Achievements: The Project was able to assure the learning and to reduce the number of working children failing at school which is as much, or more important, than to register them in school. For that reason, the reduction of school failures by means of the introduction of effective education methodologies, like the Active Rural School (Guatemala) and the Homework Rooms (Dominican Republic), points towards a strategic direction for the design of future projects.
16. Coordination of Health and Education: The experience of the Pastoral Agency for Children and Health in Chilascó left a valuable learning to the Project, showing that health activities must be part of education programs, because it facilitates the coordination of the activities, in addition to the efficient delivery of the services.
17. Strategy of Income Generation for families without property: The Project had a promising experience with income generation for families in areas of commercial agriculture with high demand for skilled labor. This experience was in Marcovia, where young people and adults were trained for insertion in the labour market, who immediately obtained a job without the inherent difficulties in the development of micro enterprises, because the jobs were available for those who had the required skills.
18. Synergies and Exit Strategies of the Project: The Project generated synergies with national public and private organizations that will contribute to the continuity of some of the actions after the completion of the project. This is the case of activities of CENET in Marcovia that will be prolonged with resources from the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and there is a possibility that Plan International continues activities in Ázua, thus replicating project activities with own resources, maintaining the ERA methodology and the Scholarships for Peace for students of the Mixed Rural School of Chilascó. In spite of this, this cannot be described as an exit strategy, since they have not been the result of an analysis by all participants nor of a process that would guarantee to be effective.

Weaknesses

19. Design Methodology: The Project was designed in two stages and in different moments. On the one hand, IPEC designed the sub-regional project and the national projects, and later the implementing agencies designed the action programs. This modality was not completely relevant because it conditioned the design of the action programs (budget and timing) and because the role of the implementing agencies was not clear. Where they supposed to be simple implementers of the predefined action programs? Or, where they supposed to contribute with conceptual and methodological inputs to optimize efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability? In practice, some action programs required more resources and time than defined in the design of the national projects, and they did not obtain the results with the quality expected. For this reason, it is recommended that in the future design of projects IPEC applies consistent criteria that do not cause difficulties in the implementation.
20. Insufficient Budgetary Allocation to Direct Actions: In the design, the allocation of resources for Action Programs ascended to 47% of the budgeted total, whereas 7% was assigned to the Monitoring system and the rest of 46% to the national and sub regional coordinators. This evaluation considers that the budgetary allocation for the coordination of the project should

not surpass 30%, whereas the system for monitoring activities and monitoring of child labour should not exceed 4 or 5%. Based on such a breakdown the budgetary allocation for Direct Actions could have increased up to 65% of the total cost.

21. Insufficient Co-financing by Governments and Employers: the design previewed that the financing of the Project would be distributed between USDOL (81%), Governments (16%) and Other partners (3%). This distribution is not considered suitable, since the amount by USDOL was a contribution to the countries to help them attain the agreements with the ILO and according to their own legislation. In addition, a significant proportion of the investments of the Project were assigned to activities that constitute the obligation of the Government, such as free and obligatory primary education. Regarding contributions of other partners such as employers organizations, it can not be omitted that the Project was of evident benefit for them, since it helped them to comply with the national legislation and it also favoured the agro-industrial exports within the regulatory framework of the Free Trade Agreement.
22. For this reason it is considered that during the design, Governments and Employers should have made financial contributions in amounts equivalent to the respective benefits, in addition to agreements and conventions that they will support.
23. Lack of Country Participation in the Management of the Project: The design previewed the establishment of steering committees, but did not describe their composition nor the functions that would correspond to them. On the other hand, the implementation did not give the due importance to these committees and preferred not to integrate them, by putting forward the argument of the institutional mandate of the National Commissions for Child Labour Eradication. These are composed of highest level Government officials that usually are not in the position to effectively participate in the project's operational aspects.
24. For the above reason it would have been more efficient to compose the committees with middle level officials and technical experts on child labour, that could have contributed to the management of the project and who could have been trained to replicate the Project in similar situations. It is worth mentioning that in some countries it was not necessary to create steering committees, since specialized technical units already exist.
25. Therefore, it is recommended to IPEC that in future projects such technical units should be responsible for higher management, or that steering committees are established that are composed of middle level officials or technical people from ministries. Their responsibility should include the technical approval of action programs and annual plans, besides of following the implementation of the Project and taking part in periodic evaluations.
26. Participatory Methodologies: The methodology proposed in the design to identify the target group was through baselines studies. Nevertheless, these studies only reflected the demographic and socioeconomic situation and identified the working children; but they did not allow assessing the evolution of working children regarding internal migrations that occur in areas of commercial agriculture. On the other hand, the Project had planned to benefit the target group with measures of social protection that included education, health and income generation, without having consulted the population and recognizing the demand of the people and the communities.
27. Although a participatory diagnosis and planning process was not anticipated, the national projects of Guatemala and Dominican Republic carried them out to know about the demand of the target group, and also to periodically review working children and their families. In both cases, these processes gave origin to social mobilization that will partly guarantee the sustainability of the results.
28. The following lesson can be made for IPEC and countries that implement child labour eradication projects: The measures of social protection anticipated in the design and the composition of the target group established by the baseline studies should be done through participatory processes of design, planning and evaluation, that can be the origin of awareness raising on child labour. This can build sustainable community organizations who will assume a leadership position in the actions to undertake.
29. Implementation Efficiency: the efficiency during the implementation was low and US\$ 1.50 coordination cost was needed to invest US\$ 1,00 in the target group. There were three aspects that negatively affected the efficiency of the Project: the unfortunate selection of three implementing agencies which did not achieve to complete their action programs, the reduction

of contributions from Governments and other Project partners with regard to what had been foreseen in the design, and the delays in the approval of action programs that postponed their start, a reason why the time for implementation was doubled. It is important to note that from 2003, IPEC decentralized the processes of technical approval of action programs, which led to the elimination of this restriction.

30. For the above reasons and to guarantee the efficiency of the investments in the target group, it would be appropriate to optimize the selection of the implementing agencies by means of an institutional diagnoses that evaluates the technical, administrative and financial capacity, and to guarantee the financial contributions of Governments and other partners to the projects by means of signing specific agreements.
31. Programs of Income Generation: The programs of income generation for the creation and commercialization of micro enterprises were not successful for several reasons: a) The programs lasted very short (18 to 30 months) and is not prudent to hope that in this period the insertion in markets and the consolidation of micro enterprises can be obtained by people who lack basic knowledge, capital and experience ; b) The budgetary allocation of the design for these programs was insufficient, since it took US\$ 417.760 to take care of 1.050 families, that is US\$ 398 by family to provide qualification, technical support, seed capital and financing; and c) The selected agencies to implement these programs did not seem to have sufficient capacity and experience in such a complex subject as the promotion of micro enterprises, that requires solid knowledge on markets, administration and management.
32. In spite of the above, there were a few micro enterprises in the service sector that were successful since they were oriented to the local demand. Another promising basis for income generation in areas of commercial agriculture was implemented by CENET in Marcovia. It consisted of training young people and adults for their insertion in the labour market, taking into account the big demand of skilled workers by the agro-industrial companies.
33. The lessons for IPEC from this experience were two. First, the programs of income generation in areas with great demand of skilled workers must be oriented primarily to training for labour market insertion. Where such a demand does not exist, micro enterprises in the service sector should be promoted based on local demand, and only as final option enterprises in the production and commercialization sector should be created.
34. As regards the technical characteristics of programs for promoting micro enterprises, the lesson is that they should be implemented by one or several agencies with proven experience in training, technical and financial assistance, that can continue providing services after the project is finished. IPEC resources should be designated to non-reimbursable seed capital and to the costs of supporting programs, but not to credits that, without doubt, can be provided by other sources. Also indicators should be included that allow to find out about income generation to evaluate the success of the micro enterprises.
35. Child Labour Monitoring: The objectives of the child labour monitoring system were insufficient since they only contemplated reporting of the evolution of the incidence of child labour in the area of the Project, without considering other aspects related to its evolution in order to assess the effectiveness of the strategy of activities and outputs. In addition to this, there were other weaknesses that did not favour the operation of the system nor its contribution to improve strategies and activities.
36. Based on the above, it is recommended for future projects to organize monitoring systems for projects as well as child labour monitoring systems as follows: a) The system must be one only, and will have to include the monitoring of activities and outputs of the project as well as the monitoring of child labour; b) The objectives of the system should be clear, and they should include the use of the information to improve the management of the Project; c) The design should define the organization of the system and the participants involved; d) The measurement of the indicators should preferably be made by local employees of public and private sectors, to reduce costs and to increase the participation of organizations in the projects; e) Define activities for the use of information to improve the management of the projects, by verifying the quality of the information and encouraging the coordination of the activities; and f) The registry and processing of data and the coordination of the system can be functions based on partial employment and could be subcontracted, but it will be essential to have a person in charge of the system for the evaluation and follow up that guarantees the process and the elaboration of the reports.

37. Learning and Knowledge Management: The Project has generated a valuable sub regional thematic experience on child labour eradication, that runs the risk of being lost with the departure of agencies and employees. For that reason it is recommended that the Project, through the sub regional coordination, makes an additional effort systematizing its more valuable experiences, and that recommendations and lessons learned are institutionalized through the elaboration of a manual on the design and implementation of child labour eradication projects, under the participation of all project stakeholders.

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1. INTRODUCTION

o THE PROJECT

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1. The main objective of the project, “Progressive Eradication of Child Labor in Commercial Agriculture in Central America and the Dominican Republic, Phase I” (RLA/00/P54/USA), was to both withdraw children in the sub-region from work in commercial agriculture, as well as to prevent other children from engaging in such labor. The executor was the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) through the Sub-regional Office in San José, Costa Rica.
2. The project was consistent with IPEC’s mission of progressively eradicating child labor, particularly its worst forms.
3. IPEC’s action is based on the political will and commitment of the region’s governments to engage in the fight against child labor in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, workers’ and employers’ organizations, and other social actors. The support which IPEC has provided to these countries puts into practice a multidisciplinary strategy that is developed in phases, and which covers:
 - a) Awareness-raising about the negative consequences of child labor;
 - b) Promotion of social mobilization against this phenomenon;
 - c) Strengthening of national capacities to fight against child labor;
 - d) Implementation of model action programs to prevent child labor, to withdraw working children from dangerous occupations, and to provide them with suitable alternatives.
4. The project was comprised of both a sub-regional project managed by a sub-regional coordination team and national projects. The project headquarters were at IPEC’s Sub-regional Office in San José, and four national projects operated in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, under the supervision of national coordinators. On the other hand, each national project included several action programs that were implemented by implementing agencies. In all, there were eleven programs being carried out throughout the span of the whole project.
5. The term for the project’s implementation was set at 30 months beginning in October, 2000, but in practice there were delays at the start of the action programs, and the implementation of the national projects concluded in August 2005, for a total of 59 months; that is, twice as long as the expected time period.
6. The budget allocated by IPEC to the project, with resources contributed by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL), amounted to US\$ 4.33 million, and was distributed as follows: i) sub-regional Project, US\$ 1.12 million; ii) project in Guatemala, US\$ 0.87 million; iii) project in Honduras, US\$ 0.79 million; iv) project in Nicaragua, US\$ 0.68 million; and v) project in the Dominican Republic, US\$ 0.87 million. This budget was increased by US\$ 0.75 million through the contributions made to the project by the national governments and other parties.
7. During the implementation of Phase I of the project, two external evaluations were carried out: a midterm evaluation (July 2001) and a final one (August 2003).

o UPDATE TO THE FINAL EVALUATION

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▪ Rationale

8. This update to the final evaluation complements the final evaluation carried out in August 2003, since a number of activities of Phase I in Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic had not been evaluated at that time, since they were still in very early stages of implementation.
9. The objectives of this evaluation are several:
 - a. to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency effects, and sustainability of the intervention in those countries,
 - b. to be accountable to the governmental agencies and stakeholders of the three countries and the donor about what was done after the August 2003 final evaluation

- c. learn from the experience in order to improve the actions of Phase II of the project that are currently being implemented,
- d. increase IPEC's knowledge base in order to be able to eradicate child labor in the agricultural sector.

10. The present assessment focuses on those activities and outcomes that were not analyzed in the final evaluation of August 2003, thus constituting an update of the conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations already proposed.

11. In addition, the analysis presented here assesses whether the extension of the activities was positive in terms of ensuring the fulfillment of the proposed objectives, as well as the sustainability of the benefits generated by the intervention.

Methodology

12. To comply with the Terms of Reference prepared by ILO-IPEC, the evaluation assessed the performance of the project, setting as priorities the following issues and aspects:

- a) Relevance and Design Quality: The assessment was carried out by analyzing the aspects not included in the August 2003 evaluation, in addition to the coherence of the activities and proposals formulated after that date.
- b) Implementation: This assessment focuses on aspects related to the management, coordination, and creation of synergies from August 2003 to date. Some of the topics considered were compliance with the pre-established schedules, the performance of the project's management team, the efficiency of the administrative systems, the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms, the quality of the activities, the performance of the implementing agencies of the action programs, the participation and role of local management structures (both national and local committees), the technical and organizational support offered by IPEC, the compliance of the governmental entities with the project, the commitments of workers' and employers' organizations to the project, and the project's capacity to mobilize additional resources.
- c) Achievements: These were examined beginning in August 2003 and related with the immediate objectives (effectiveness) and the resources invested (efficiency) by identifying success and restrictive factors. To do this, the achievements already described in the final evaluation were updated. It was then determined whether or not the project had continued to provide suitable and adequate services to the beneficiaries, and the efficiency of the investment made was weighed. Moreover, the unexpected outcomes (both positive and negative) and the multiplying effects were identified by reviewing those identified in the final evaluation, and by adding other relevant effects.
- d) Sustainability perspectives: Analysis of these took into account the conclusions of the final evaluation, the implementation of an exit strategy for the project, and the effectiveness levels of the child-labor monitoring systems.

13. The evaluation included four categories of activities. The intensity of these activities depended on the time that had been assigned to the evaluation, as well as the availability of quantitative and qualitative information gathered by the project itself and in the previous evaluations carried out.⁷

- a) Documents reviewed (desk study): A detailed and careful revision of the documents supplied by the project's subregional coordination was done; the list of documents analyzed appears in the Annex of this report.
- b) Analysis of the outcomes (exits) of the monitoring systems: This corresponded to the national coordination teams of the participating countries in order to study the available information, its coherence, and general usefulness.
- c) Interviews: 58 interviews were held with various stakeholders, including the following entities and individuals:
 - i) Donor: A virtual interview was carried out with program officers of the United States Department of Labor (USDOL), through a questionnaire sent by e-mail;
 - ii) Project's officials and technicians: Individual interviews were held in the Sub-regional Headquarters of IPEC and in the national coordination offices of the projects;

⁷ Midterm in July 2001 and Final in August 2003

- iii) Coordinators and technicians of the implementing agencies: Individual and group interviews were done with the people who participated in the action programs of Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic;
- iv) Governmental officials: Individual interviews were carried out with ministers, vice ministers, national directors, regional coordinators, and technicians of several public institutions in Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic;
- v) Employers and workers: Group and individual interviews were held with representatives of the national and regional organizations in Honduras and the Dominican Republic;
- vi) Beneficiaries and other project participants: Group and individual interviews were carried out with children who had been withdrawn from work or who had been prevented from engaging in it, as well as with families who were benefited by the action programs, in addition to interviews done with community monitoring committees and with teachers in the project's areas of intervention in Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.

The individual interviews were conducted by using structured questionnaires that included questions about issues related to areas in which the interviewees carried out their activities. In contrast, the group interviews were conducted using focus groups by proposing opinion-generating topics in order to promote the participants' interventions.

The interviews were done over a period of 15 days, and their geographic distribution was as follows: 5 interviews held at IPEC's sub-regional headquarters in San José, 14 in Guatemala, 19 in Honduras, and 20 in the Dominican Republic;

- d) Presentation workshop. This was held at the project's sub-regional headquarters in San José on August 30, 2005 in order to discuss the conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned through the evaluation. The participants at this workshop were officials from IPEC's sub-regional headquarters in San José, USDOL program officials, and staff on the national coordination teams of the project.

1. PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

o DESIGN RELEVANCE

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14. The project's design was coherent with the IPEC's objectives and mission, since it was aimed at eradicating child labor in commercial agriculture in the sub-region. It also has the demonstrative nature which is sought in such interventions, that is, serving as a model, since national independent projects were created in order to demonstrate IPEC's proposed child-labor eradication methodology and social protection measures to the diverse relevant national entities.

15. This section analyzes the formulation and design of the project, the project's objectives, its intervention strategies, and the project's overall organization.

▪ Formulation and design

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16. The project was formulated and designed at two different times, and those responsible for each design were different entities in each case. First, IPEC formulated the sub-regional project and the national projects based on its guidelines, its experience in other regions, and the donor's requirements.

17. Then, the action programs were formulated; these included direct actions to benefit the target group. Those responsible for this formulation and design were the NGOs that implemented them. Thus, the start of this stage of the design required the implementation of national coordination teams, the identification of the NGOs, and the preparation of the baseline studies⁸ of the intervention areas.

18. The formulation and design of the action programs was done in consultation with the national coordination teams. The action programs were based on the guidelines that had been set for national projects, as well as on the information gathered by the baseline studies. This meant that these designs were conditioned by the initial design of the project, at least as far as their stated goals, terms of implementation, and budgets.

19. This design mode is not completely relevant in the evaluator's opinion, because the role of the NGOs in the project is not clear. Namely, was it believed that these agencies would simply be the implementing agencies or contractors of clearly defined action programs? Or, to the contrary, was it expected that they would make conceptual and methodological contributions in order to optimize the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the project?

20. In the first case, with NGOs acting only as implementing agencies, the projects' design should have been more detailed and precise, since this would have prevented the approval process which the action programs later underwent. But, if NGOs were required to make conceptual and methodological contributions, which would have been relevant given IPEC's lack of experience in the sub-region, the final design of the sub-regional project and of the national projects should have been delayed so as to make it possible to adjust their goals, implementation terms, and budget.

▪ Relevance of the Development Objective

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21. The project's development objective was as follows: *"Eliminate child labor progressively, especially in the agricultural sector of Central America and the Dominican Republic,"* and this was to be carried out by:

- a) preventing at-risk children from working full-time in agricultural activities, and by withdrawing from work those already involved in these activities, with priority being given to those children who work in dangerous or risky activities;
- b) offering viable alternatives to the children and their families through a set of social protection measures (education, health, and income generation);
- c) mobilizing the support and efforts of the producers, communities, families, NGOs, teachers, and local authorities, and collaborating closely with them in order to initiate actions to prevent child labor;

⁸ Descriptive studies used to identify and provide statistics about the target population, the intervention areas, and the characteristics of child labor in those areas.

- d) designing and implementing a child-labor monitoring system which would be operational and independent;
- e) promoting the exchange of experiences regarding the prevention and eradication of child labor in the agricultural sector; this was to be done both at the national and regional levels.
22. The project's development objective is fully coherent with the situation of child-labor in agriculture in the sub-region, as well as with IPEC's mission, because most of the working children in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are employed in this sector (Table 1).

Table 1. Situation of Child Labor in Agriculture
- Working Children -

COUNTRY	Number of Working Children		Agriculture						
			Age			Sex		School Attendance	
	National	Agriculture	5-9	10-14	15-17	Men	Women	Yes	No
Guatemala	938,000	540,000	66,000	268,000	206,000	432,000	108,000	245,000	295,000
Honduras	356,000	197,000	10,000	90,000	97,000	183,000	14,000	60,000	137,000
Nicaragua	253,000	134,000	16,000	63,000	55,000	117,000	17,000	58,000	76,000
TOTAL	1,547,000	871,000	92,000	421,000	358,000	732,000	139,000	363,000	508,000
Dominican Rep.	100%	19%	25%	46%	29%	92%	18%	88%	12%

Source: Child Labor in Agriculture in Figures, ILO-IPEC, 2004

23. The types of crops in the agricultural activities selected for the project were also relevant since these were the ones that complied with the prerequisite of involvement with the massive employment of children, even though there are other crops being raised in the selected areas that also lead to the hiring of child workers by plantation owners. This condition is also coherent with IPEC's overall strategy for the sub-region, since coffee is among the crops that massively employ children, but it is also part of another IPEC project being carried out with funds donated by USDOL.

24. It should be added that this appraisal of the relevance of the crops selected is not in accordance with the final evaluation of August 2003, which did not consider them appropriate for the definition of national projects. This is understandable in part because within the area of intervention, there are other agricultural occupations that hire child workers in very large numbers and that also employ children who have been laid off from work in the selected crops. This is the case of the melon-raising project in Marcovia, Honduras, where the related occupations include work in sugarcane harvesting, shrimp and *tilapia* fish breeding,⁹ salt extraction, fishing, and street vending. However, the alternative of carrying out an intervention to eradicate child labor in Marcovia would not have been adequate for a project, this given the diversity of productive sectors and, as a result, of needed intervention methodologies. It seems that the project's identification per se was inaccurate, and that the design should have refined the title of the project so as to expand its coverage and specificity.

25. In any event, the case of Marcovia is not the same as that of Chilascó, Guatemala, or Azua, in the Dominican Republic, where broccoli and tomato are the crops on the plantations that employ practically all of the these areas' working children. In addition, the national project in Honduras considered this situation, and inaccurately named the project so as to expand it to also include sugarcane harvesting work.

26. Regarding the social protection measures proposed, the emphasis on education turned out to be relevant. This is confirmed by the data presented in the table; the figures show a positive correlation between child labor and school non-attendance in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Thus, the strategy of promoting children's enrollment and permanent attendance in school was correct.

27. This correlation between school attendance and child labor does not, however, take place in the Dominican Republic, where child labor seems to be more related to school failure, as measured by grade repetition and desertion.¹⁰ Also in this case, the program strategy of emphasizing education was relevant because it attacked the problem of school failure by means of the "Homework Rooms," which

⁹ Type of fish produced commercially in artificial tanks

¹⁰ Repetition: number of children who repeat the grade. Desertion: number of children who enroll but later stop attending school to work in the fields

are aimed at reinforcing the learning of subjects that prove to be difficult for the children, and that were identified as such by the teachers.

28. The relevance of the health component does not seem to be doubtful, since the target population lives in conditions of poverty in areas where public health services are weak and where there is a high incidence of disease. Therefore, good school performance may not be expected from sick and malnourished children. However, the health activities are justifiable only if they are related to education, but not just on their own account.

29. The generation of family income that allows school expenses to be covered, and makes it possible for families to do without the income generated by the child workers, is also a core element in the actions taken. Nevertheless, the strategy for each area should have been defined based on a deep knowledge of the respective socioeconomic and agrarian situations, as well as upon the participation of the target groups to diagnose the situations and to plan and assess the actions to be taken.

30. Something similar happened with the methodology for raising the awareness of the general population and the beneficiaries of these actions, since the reasons for and characteristics of child labor are different depending on whether they are in the family-based commercial agricultural areas or in the large entrepreneurial agricultural areas.

31. The purpose of the local child-labor monitoring systems was to measure the overall impact of the program. Its objectives were the following: i) to ensure that the target population is being benefited by the project; ii) to systematically withdraw children from labor, and to enroll those identified in the baseline study in schools; iii) to periodically report on the target group's children; and iv) to measure the progressive withdrawal of children from work activities, and to bring about the prevention of other children from engaging in labor.

32. In principle, these objectives seem correct. However, this evaluation considers them incomplete since they did not include the use of the information required in order to adjust the project's strategy and actions. If this objective had been included, it would have been possible to involve the implementing agencies as well as public and private local entities in data gathering and the use of information. This would have made it possible to manage the project based on its outcomes, and to reduce the project's intervention costs while improving the quality of the information. This latter improvement would have been brought about because information that is utilized is constantly subjected to verification by the system users.

33. On the contrary, the system's central objective was to issue reports to IPEC and the donor. It also had other weaknesses that made the system difficult to implement and the objective hard to achieve. In fact, some of the indicators, and the methodology used to measure them, were not operational. Thus, the main indicator was the number of children identified on the plantations, a figure which proved to not be operational because of the large extension of the plantations and the difficulty of detecting working children, especially those that did not want to be identified and thus eluded detection.

34. Moreover, the system was managed by the project's national coordinator and those responsible for the measurements were to be monitors hired by IPEC, who would make about 200 visits per month, selecting the sites at random and announcing their visits. These monitors would sometimes be accompanied by the local labor inspector so as to be able to then transfer the methodology to this person. This procedure was intended as an attempt to give continuity to the monitoring system through the inspection department of the Ministry of Labor. However, this was not appropriate because the lack of personnel and resources in these local inspection departments was not considered in advance. Nor was the scant interest of the Ministries of Labor in the system taken into account, as their information needs are already satisfied through the child-labor modules included in the household, income, and/or consumption surveys.

■ Relevance of the Immediate Objectives


35. The immediate objectives of the national projects were limited to defining the attention goals of the target group, but these objectives were not very accurate or detailed regarding the foundations, objectives, and strategies of the action programs. This precision was necessary given the evident differences in social, economic, and agrarian issues, as well as in access to basic services in the intervention areas, all of which resulted in different strategies having to be defined.

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36. In this respect, the final evaluation of August 2003 already indicated that child labor in the three areas had not been well identified in the design, and that it is evident that the agricultural industries in Marcovia and the small broccoli producers in Chilascó have different characteristics with regards to child labor. The former hire the adults and children of families with no land, who mainly depend on the wages they earn, while child labor in Chilascó almost exclusively occurs on family-owned properties. This is because broccoli producers are small landholders¹¹ with a greater capacity to generate income than farm workers from other areas.

37. This matches the occupational category of working children in agriculture in the sub-region (Figure 1), which shows a difference among the three Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. In the first, unpaid, family-based work predominates; while in the latter, in most cases, the workers get paid.

Figure 1. Occupational Category of Child Workers in Agriculture



38. These socio-economic, agrarian, and occupational category differences in child labor should have given rise to different strategies for the action programs to generate income as well as to raise awareness.

39. This derives from diverse cultural perspectives, since part-time child labor on family plots in Chilascó is considered by the community as "formative work," that is, as an activity that teaches the young and helps them to mature, or else as fostering the "transmission of the family culture." Whereas in the agricultural industrial area, child labor is seen as due to the families' need for survival because of their dependence on this income. Thus, the message, the target audience, and the means for the awareness-raising actions should have been different.

40. Regarding the income-generation strategy, the agricultural industrial area of Marcovia is characterized by a very important demand for well trained, salaried employees,¹² so the income generation strategy should have given priority to training for insertion into the job market. In contrast, the family-based type of agriculture in Chilascó does not have this demand for a salaried or wage-earning work force; thus, the income generation should have been addressed mainly to the provision of services that are locally in demand and the improvement in the productivity of the family land. The situation in Azua is midpoint between the other two: it has companies that hire skilled workers, although significantly fewer than in Marcovia, and small producers who require a salaried work force for specific tasks (transplanting and harvesting).

41. This would also mean that the national melon project in Marcovia is not representative enough of the national situation of child labor; however, the size and seriousness of the problem in this area are important enough to justify its selection.

42. Another element that was absent from the national projects' design was to propose participatory processes of diagnosis, planning, and assessment that would involve the families and local institutions. These processes have already been incorporated in other areas of development, and they have had very good results with respect to their effectiveness and sustainability. This has been

¹¹ It is a community property that has not been segregated and the use of the community land is a right for the families in the community. The administration of these rights is in the hands of a Board of Directors of the Community.

¹² Estimated are about 3,000 permanent jobs and 9,000 temporary jobs during the harvest season

due to the fact that the beneficiaries themselves have to choose what to do and how to do it with the help of technicians.

■ The Operational and Organization Strategy of the Project

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43. The logic of the operational strategy is effective and efficient for management as it divides the action settings into the following levels:

- a) The sub-regional level specialized in cross-sectional topics such as institutional strengthening and child-labor monitoring systems, in addition to coordination, administration, follow-up of the implementation, and issuing progress reports.
- b) The national level was devoted to coordinating the implementation of the direct action programs of the local child-labor monitoring systems, as well as to carrying out awareness-raising, mobilization, and institutional strengthening, in addition to undertaking the first administrative controls or checks.
- c) The local operation level of the direct action programs in charge of the implementing agencies with experience and prestige in the intervention areas.

44. The national project formulation and design documents also identified the implementing agencies. In Guatemala, these agencies were Plan Internacional, Consejo Departamental de Desarrollo, and Asociación de Exportadores de Productos No Tradicionales (AGEXPRONT). In Honduras, they were Fundación Hondureña de Desarrollo Integral Comunitario, Cámara de Comercio e Industria de Choluteca, and Universidad Nacional de Honduras. In the Dominican Republic, the agency identified was Grupo Ambiental Hábitat.

45. An aspect that was neither effective nor efficient is that the top management of the project was in the hands of IPEC-Geneva, which was in charge of the technical and financial approval of the action programs with budgets of more than US\$ 15,000. The participation of this office, which probably does not have wide enough experience in the intervention areas, caused delays in the implementation of the entire project, and generated an increase in the operating costs at the sub-regional and national levels. However, from 2003 technical approval has been decentralized and therefore speeded up the process.

46. The design expected the project to be implemented in close collaboration with key ministries to eradicate child labor, including the Ministries of Labor, Education, Health, Family, and Agriculture. It also counted on the participation of the mass media, employers' and workers' organizations, community organizations, NGOs, and the national committees for the prevention and elimination of child labor.

47. The project also considered a sustainability strategy which was consistent with ensuring the funding of the education and health components and to strengthen the capacity of the implementing agencies for the design and implementation of similar programs. Nevertheless, the definition of the activities that would sustain the strategy was not clearly defined in the project, nor was the need to conceive an exit strategy that would be included from the start of the project's actions.

■ Project Budget

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48. The budget allocated in the project design, as shown in the table below, indicates that 47% was assigned to the direct actions to be carried out with the target population; this percentage is low if compared with agricultural and rural development projects in general.

Table 2. Project Budget for Guatemala, Honduras, and Dominican Republic
- in US\$ and % -

COMPONENT	BUDGET (US\$)			TOTAL	
	USDOL	Governments	Other Partners	US\$	%
Subregional Coordinations (75%)	841.876			841.876	21%
National Coordinations	996.991		17.000	1.013.991	25%
Baseline and CL Monitoring	254.540	15.480	4.000	274.020	7%
Action Programs	1.144.540	606.615	106.240	1.857.395	47%
TOTAL FOR PROJECT	3.237.947	622.095	127.240	3.987.282	100%
	81%	16%	3%	100%	

Source: Prepared from the Project formulation documents

49. In contrast, the sub-regional¹³ and national coordination teams were allocated 46%, and the child-labor monitoring system 7% (baseline and monitoring), figures that turn out to be high when the same comparison is made. Although strictly assigning the same budget percentages to this project as is done with agricultural and rural development projects might be questioned, there is great similarity regarding the intervention area, actions, and operation modes, all of which may conduce to this being considered as a guide. These projects rarely assign more than 25% of the total budget to coordination, while monitoring and evaluation usually do not exceed 4%.

50. Another aspect that seems relevant for analysis is the distribution by funding source. It has been verified that USDOL's contribution was relatively high, especially for a donation. In contrast, the governments' contributions were low. It is likely that negotiation with the governments during the project formulation and design, based on this criterion, would have made it possible to have them agree to increase their contributions. Additionally, the contribution of the employers' organizations was very low, especially if it is considered that the project would clearly be beneficial for them. This aspect should be carefully considered in future projects, and acted upon by encouraging and creating alliances with the partners involved in the intervention areas.

51. The distribution of the investments in the national projects (broccoli in Chilascó, melon in Marcovia, and tomato in Azua (Table 3) shows that the action programs that received the most resources were those related with education, with a total amount equivalent to 36%. This decision was correctly made since their objective was to improve the educational conditions and reduce families' costs when enrolling children in school. On the other hand, these actions were complemented with the awareness-raising programs; it would not be very effective to promote the schooling of working children when the educational conditions are deficient and the enrollment costs cannot be supported by the families. The budgetary allocation per national project is shown in the Annex.

52. In this regard, the contribution of the government of Guatemala to education should be highlighted. It made a commitment to increase the number of teachers in the school of Chilascó in order to be able to provide attention to children that were withdrawn and prevented from work, as well as a commitment to contribute to the training of the teachers, and to provide food for preschool children.¹⁴ It is also important to highlight the financial commitment of the government of the Dominican Republic to the education program, whose goals were providing school supplies and uniforms for children, and training teachers.

¹³ It includes 75% of the subregional project budget (US\$ 1,122,501), since the national project in Nicaragua is not evaluated in this report.

¹⁴ The chapter about Implementation discusses the preferential assignment of the Scholarships for Peace, which was a substantial contribution to the Project.

Table 3. Budgetary Allocation of the National Projects
- per Component and Action Program -

Project Component / Action Program	AMOUNT PER DONOR			TOTAL	
	IPEC (US\$)	Government (US\$)	Partners (US\$)	US\$	%
Guatemala, Honduras, and Dominican Rep.					
Coordination	624.450	0	17.000	641.450	20%
Support and Contingencie	372.541	0	0	372.541	12%
Baseline	55.200	2.000	4.000	61.200	2%
CL Monitoring	199.340	15.480	0	214.820	7%
Action Programs					0%
- Education	531.620	550.171	48.000	1.129.791	36%
- Income Generation	401.760	2.000	14.000	417.760	13%
- Health	122.700	32.444	32.000	187.144	6%
- Awareness raising	88.460	20.000	12.240	120.700	4%
Total Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic	2.396.071	622.095	127.240	3.145.406	100%
	76%	20%	4%	100%	

-Source: Prepared from the Project document data

53. The final evaluation in August 2003 concluded that the donations for education are not a positive contribution because they are not sustainable; however, this evaluation considers that they are an obligation of the Governments whose constitutions establish that elementary school must be free and compulsory. This is based on the fact that given the conditions of poverty in the rural areas of Central America and the Dominican Republic, free education is only viable if the State contributes with supplies, food, and other subsidies to the families. Thus, during the project negotiations, IPEC should have demanded that Governments commit to these contributions, based on its prestige as a United Nations Programme that promotes a honorable case, although in monetary terms it's power for negotiation might not be significant.

54. The budgetary allocation of the income generation programs was especially low (13% of the total budget). This is due to the fact that it is overly optimistic to believe that under the conditions of poverty of the families without land who depend on a salary from commercial agriculture, an investment of US\$ 417,760 could substantially modify the income generation of 1,050 families. That is, the belief was that only US\$ 398 per family would assist these beneficiaries to the point that they could do away altogether with the income formerly generated by their children, and be able to enroll them in school and guarantee their ongoing attendance in classes. A comparative element for this amount is that in the rural development projects, a similar amount is assigned for refundable funds for recurring production expenses, but that this does not include the investment in training or in infrastructure and equipment that in recent years have been granted on a non-refundable basis.

55. On the other hand, it should be recognized that a duration of only 18 to 30 months for the national projects can hardly guarantee that a significant number of these families will be able to consolidate their new micro-enterprises.

56. This does not mean that IPEC should have more resources to finance the income generation programs, but rather that it should create alliances with the international cooperation agencies and public and private programs for poverty reduction in order to be able to properly attend to these actions. Nor would it be necessary for the project to contribute resources for refundable loans, since in the sub-region there is a wide network of micro-financial entities¹⁵ that specialize in this population. These are entities that have their own financial resources, and that would only require that the project provide the training and technical assistance needed by the families during a given term that would guarantee the success of their new businesses, as well as, eventually, covering some costs so as to be able to open branches in the intervention areas.

57. Another aspect of the design that also merits attention is the difference in respective cost for children withdrawn from labor and prevented from engaging in work. In the broccoli project in

¹⁵ Visit www.redcamif.org

Chilascó, the cost per child is significantly higher than the average, and also higher than the other two national projects. This takes place despite the fact that the condition of poverty of these families is more critical in Marcovia and Azua. Apparently the higher cost was due to the smaller number of children benefited, as well as to the important investment made by the government of Guatemala in education. However, this value should be considered carefully for the design of future projects to be more relevant.

Table 4. Project Goals and Unit Costs

PROJECT	AREA	ACTION PROGRAMS	GOALS			COST (US\$)	
			Children and Adolescents		Families	Total	Per Child
			Withdrawn	Prevented			
Broccoli Project in Guatemala	Chilascó	Education and Health, Income Generation, Awareness-Raising	1.120		250	1.203.881	1.075
Melon Project in Honduras	Marcovia	Education and Health, Income Generation, Awareness-Raising	960	240	500	883.780	736
Tomato Projecto in Dominican Rep.	Azua	Education and Health, Income Generation, Awareness-Raising	900	5.300	300	1.102.745	178
TOTAL PROYECTO AGRICULTURA COMERCIAL			2.980	5.540	1.050	3.190.406	374

Source: Prepared from the data in the project documents

Recommendations of the Final Evaluation of August 2003

58. The final evaluation carried out in August 2003 included 22 conclusions or findings, which are mostly shared by this evaluation. About 30 recommendations were made on the basis of said conclusions; some of these recommendations are not fully shared.

59. These conclusions and recommendations refer to diverse aspects of the projects, with the following contents and distribution: i) 7 referred to the design, the interpretation of the problem, and how to solve it (32%); ii) 5 were related to the implementation and management (23%); iii) 9 correspond to the project effects (41%); and iv) the last factor deals with the sustainability of the actions and effects.

60. This distribution indicates that a weakness of the project was its design, which did not match up with the characteristics of child labor in commercial agriculture in the sub-region and with the diversity of agricultural sectors involved. It stresses the relationship with the child-labor monitoring system, whose purpose was not clearly defined, thus being difficult to implement in practice.

61. Regarding the implementation and management, the conclusions and recommendations were considered by the evaluators as being preliminary by virtue of the fact that several components and programs had been started only recently.

62. The conclusions about the results indicate that to a great extent they were being achieved, but the evaluators did not find a clear correlation between the Immediate Objectives of the components and the action programs, and the achievement of the Development Objective.

63. Finally, the conclusion about sustainability proposes serious doubts because the situation of poverty of the target group was not reduced to a significant degree when compared to the dimension of the problem, especially considering that this is the principal decisive factor in child labor. In addition, the other social protection actions (health and education) used subsidies that would be unlikely to have continuity after the end of the project.

Adjustments in the Implementation of Phase I and the Design of Phase II

64. The chief technical advisor of the project voiced agreement on several of the conclusions and recommendations, and stated that several had been incorporated to the implementation. These included the following:

- a) The reduction of the periodicity of the reports to the donor: rather than being issued on a quarterly basis, they were instead issued only every six months, thus significantly reducing the workload;
- b) The suspension of the child-labor monitoring activities as proposed in the design, and their being replaced by local actions and surveillance entities. This was a measure which reduced costs and strengthened the civil sector organizations as well as the educational community;

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- c) The topic of the sustainability of actions and effects was fully assumed by the project team. Efforts were made to extend the implementation period of some of the actions. In order to do so, they identified external resources that allowed the implementing agencies to continue the action programs, or resources that involved new organizations that could continue the actions. The cases which this evaluation learned of are the following I) the identification of funds of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Honduras that guaranteed the continuity of CENET in Marcovia in charge of the occupational training program; ii) negotiations were carried out with the NGO Plan Internacional for it to continue all the action programs in 10 communities of Azua (the current 6 in operation plus 4 more); finally, an important verbal commitment was obtained from this organization, this being a commitment to take over this intervention with its own funds.
65. Regarding the recommendations about the design and effects related to the interpretation of the problem of child labor and the strategies to solve it, these adjustments could not be made because the project was already in an advanced stage.


o IMPLEMENTATION

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66. The project's organization (Figure 2) was that which was proposed in the design, and it included a sub-regional project and four national projects, whose geographic intervention areas and selected commercial crops were the following:
- National Project Guatemala (GUA/00/P50/USA): Broccoli in San Rafael Chilascó, Municipality of Salamá, Province of Baja Verapaz;
 - National Project Honduras (HON/00/P50/USA): Melon in the Municipality of Marcovia, Province of Choluteca;
 - National Project the Dominican Republic (DOM/00/P50/USA): Tomato in the municipalities of Azua de Compostela, Pueblo Viejo, Sabana Yegua, and Villa Tabara Abajo, Province of Azua.
 - National Project Nicaragua: Basic staples and Livestock¹⁶ in the municipality of Chontales, Province of Chontales;
67. The four national projects implemented 11 action programs by contracting 13 implementing agencies, which are listed in the table. It is important to point out that 3 agencies (CIPE Consultants, Project HOPE, and INDESUI) did not complete the implementation of their contracts, and had to be replaced.
68. The project officially started in October 2000, and was expected to last for 30 months, but it was extended because of several delays in starting the action programs. The end date of the project in Guatemala was October 2004, while the programs of the Dominican Republic ended in August 2005 and the one in Honduras in September 2005. This means that the actual duration of the project was extended to 60 months, which is twice as long as planned.
69. The good performance of the sub-regional project and the national projects was decisive for the success of the project. This allowed some weaknesses in the design to be solved in the field as the project progressed. The positive elements that contributed to adjusting the strategies and activities were the supervision exerted by the sub-regional coordination, the experience and capacity of the national coordination teams, and the support of the national IPEC offices. The experience and prestige of some of the implementing agencies also contributed to making it possible to effect the necessary adjustments.

¹⁶ The Project in Nicaragua is not included in this evaluation since it was closed the 30th of September 2004.

Figure 2. Operational Organization of the Project



■ Components, Action Programs, and Main Activities

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70. The national projects in the three countries had the same components: institutional strengthening, direct action, and child-labor monitoring. The institutional strengthening component included the awareness-raising and mobilization component, while the direct action component included the action programs in education, income generation, and health. The child-labor monitoring component, however, did not develop satisfactorily, and the model proposed in the design was modified by adopting a surveillance system.

71. Institutional strengthening component: the awareness-raising and mobilization action programs were the most successful in the participating countries. The evaluation was able to confirm that the population and local entities were clearly aware of the need to both eradicate child labor and to enroll former child workers in school to improve their opportunities for the future. The social actors that best responded to this component were the communities covered, but some very positive effects were also verified with respect to the authorities of the various school districts, teachers, some workers’ and teachers’ unions, organizations of small producers, and business organizations. It should be pointed out that agro-industrial businesses were also influenced by the potential sanctions for their exports within the DR-CAFTA¹⁷.

72. The positive outcomes of this component were due both to the implementation of the action programs of awareness-raising and to some actions undertaken by the national coordinators of the projects. In this sense, the community assemblies held in Chilascó, Guatemala, not only made raising the awareness of the child workers’ families possible, but also contributed valuable elements toward defining an education strategy that could meet the needs of the families and aid in their attaining their

¹⁷ Dominican Republic and Central America Free Trade Agreement

aspirations. In practice, both assemblies were used to make participation diagnoses that allowed for learning about the interpretation of the community with respect to the use of child labor for farming on family-owned plots of land. This activity is considered as formative, that is, a kind of skills training. Moreover, for many families, farming is even better than formal education since children learn to sow the parcel which they would inherit in the future, rather than learning information that was not very relevant for their surroundings. Additionally, the families were opposed to children having to subject themselves to the personal frustration of having to repeat several grades, as well as to causing their families the trauma of that failure.

73. The actions of the national coordination teams were also very important for informing the national authorities about the relevance and effectiveness of the project. This was done through several visits to the intervention area with top level officers. These visits made it easier for representatives of the national governments to learn about and become involved in the project, which so far had been unknown to them.

74. Another activity that was part of this component and that only recently started in Honduras¹⁸ in July 2005, was the systematization of experiences to obtain recommendations and lessons learned that could be useful for the implementation of the second phase of the project, and for the design of future projects in the subregion.

75. **Direct Action Component:** the action programs of this component were formulated and designed by the implementing agencies in consultation with the national coordination teams, as well as through office work carried out without the participation of the target population. This lack of participation of the beneficiaries did not contribute to the success of the programs, and finally had to be replaced to a certain extent by the national coordination actions in order to guarantee the active participation of the population. This is what happened in Chilascó with the parents' assemblies, which allowed for adjustments to be made to the program strategy in order for education to meet the families' expectations.

76. The most effective action programs were the education programs carried out in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, since they managed to implement innovative educational modes that are highly suitable for the withdrawal and prevention of child workers, and very satisfactory for their families. This strategy, which was mainly aimed at improving the quality of the education provided rather than directly promoting assistance through subsidies, had excellent results since it increased working children's enrollment and permanent attendance in school, while also reducing the grade repetition rates.¹⁹

77. The mode implemented in Guatemala was the "Active Rural School" (ARS)²⁰, whose methodology's most outstanding characteristics are the following: the contents were related to the local surroundings, and use was made of thematic guides with successive evaluation and flexible graduation or leveling. These features promoted a greater interest among children and wider acceptance among families, thanks to the good educational results obtained. Regarding the changes in the educational changes in Chilascó, the Vice Minister of Labor and Social Planning of Guatemala, stated:

I visited Chilascó over a month ago, and was quite favorably impressed by the project. The aspects that interested me the most were the children's improved development and ability, along with their ease in the mixed rural elementary school. I was pleased to note their involvement in the "school government," the increase in enrollment, and the low desertion and failure rates.

78. A very positive contribution for the education program in Chilascó were the Peace Scholarships provided by the Ministry of Education, these being equivalent to US\$ 40 per child each year in order to assist families who need to buy school supplies and uniforms. These scholarships were granted annually as follows: in the year 2002, 205 scholarships were awarded; in 2003, 500 scholarships; in 2005, 500 scholarships were granted, and the government has already promised to

¹⁸ CENET, as part of its Occupational Training action program

¹⁹ Number of children that repeat the grade synonym of school failure and child and family frustration

²⁰ Method derived from the Escuela Unitaria (One-Teacher School), in which the curriculum of a grade is composed of several guides to be completed successively. When children do not pass all the guides, because they did not learn the content or were absent, they continue with the original group and pass when they complete all the corresponding guides.

award 500 scholarships for 2006²¹. An efficient measure introduced by the project was the administration of these resources by a committee composed of parents and teachers, which managed to save some money on the purchase of the school supplies and uniforms.

79. In the Dominican Republic, 88%²² of working children enroll in school, but a large percentage drop out and repeat the grade. The measure known as “Salas de Tareas” (Homework or Study Rooms) was adopted. In this case, small groups of children with learning difficulties work with a facilitator in order to reinforce the topics required by the teachers. These remedial sessions were held in municipal or community meeting rooms, and in private homes. Each facilitator worked with groups of 10 to 20 children of approximately the same age and level who attended sessions daily for two hours in the morning or afternoon in addition to their school hours. The program included recreational, sports, and cultural activities²³ to complement the instruction and to encourage children’s interest.

80. It is necessary to point out that these remedial sessions to reinforce regular schooling were not only beneficial for the children who had been withdrawn from work and who were behind in their learning, but also for non-working children in the same situation. The children’s interest in learning being maintained during the day proved to be a very effective strategy to prevent children at risk from working.

81. In Honduras, the education action program was initially geared toward giving out school supplies and other materials. Its results were limited since the contract with the agency CIPE Consultants was suspended for noncompliance. Nevertheless, the project decided to continue with the program, and in June 2004, it hired CARE Internacional * Honduras). The purpose of the new contract was to improve the coverage of the program EDUCATODOS of the State Secretariat of Education, which provides services for children, adolescents, and adults who are behind in their schooling and education. This is done through a teaching methodology that uses voice recordings and the support of facilitators. Although the coverage of this program is larger than before, the fact that it started late has not allowed the expected results to be obtained.

82. The action programs dealing with income generation were aimed at promoting and developing new production, commercial, and service activities that would make it possible to compensate for the income that used to be generated by the children withdrawn from labor. The results of these programs were insufficient, but the number of families benefited that did earn better income was much smaller than the target (10 to 20%), although 96% were trained.

83. The explanations for the poor results include the short duration of the programs, their late implementation, and the interruption of the loans to capitalize and operate the micro-enterprises that had been established. This is evidenced in the fact that most of the successful cases are located in Guatemala, which started the program in July 2002 and implemented it without difficulties. On the other hand, in the Dominican Republic, the program started in September 2002, but the loans to most of the micro-enterprises were not granted until 2004. In Honduras, the program started recently, in June 2004; the financial support only included limited donations, and no loans were granted. A case that illustrates the difficulties undergone by some micro-entrepreneurs is that of a group of women who established a company that prepared fast food in Marcovia, Honduras. Unfortunately, since they did not get a loan to buy an industrial oven, they were not operating at a business scale.

84. One aspect that is clear is that the economic and financial maturation period of the micro-enterprises usually takes longer than the technical and financial support provided by the project, so at the time of this evaluation some of the micro-enterprises had not yet started operating at a business scale, and others were already facing technical and financial difficulties. Referring to this the executive director of CENET stated:

The success of the micro-enterprises depends on their receiving more extended support from the projects, since insertion in the market creates new demands for training, technical assistance, and funding.

85. A third negative element of these programs was the interruption of loans during 2003, following USDOL requirements²⁴, which caused the subsequent interruption of the funding to

²¹ During 2004 no scholarships had been given, probably due to the change of Government at the beginning of the year.

²² “Labor in Agricultura in Figures,” IPEC

²³ Singing, dancing, drama, and others

²⁴ Through an official notice send to IPEC by USDOL dated April 9th 2003

beneficiaries, although they still required it. To solve this setback in Guatemala, the beneficiaries had to repay the borrowed amounts, in order to later receive the funds as non-reimbursable seed capital. This took away credibility from the project.

86. Nevertheless, this evaluation learned of successful cases, some of them in Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, including the production of *pilones*²⁵ and baked goods, as well as work carried out in carpentry, ecological tourism, and maritime engine repair.

87. Another action line of the income generation program was Vocational Training for Labor Insertion. This program was geared toward young persons and adults, and its purpose was to enhance their possibilities of being hired by companies requiring skilled labor. The income generation alternative was used in Honduras, and its record or successful cases seems very promising for the areas of commercial, non-family based agriculture, in which there is usually an important demand for skilled workers for the agricultural industrial companies. To get an idea of the dimension of the demand in these areas, during the harvest season in Marcovia, Honduras, agricultural export companies hire around 12,000 employees, including both permanent and seasonal workers.

88. The health programs aimed at preventive health care, nutrition, and the treatment of illnesses resulting from hazardous child labor encountered serious difficulties in their implementation. For instance, in Marcovia the contract with the implementing agency was suspended, and in Azua they had coordination problems with the Provincial Directorate of Health, which forced them to permanently interrupt the activities. Only in Chilascó was it possible to comply with the activity schedule; this is attributed to the fact that it was an educational and health component which was implemented by the same implementing agency, thus achieving maximum coordination of activities and savings of resources.

89. There, then, is an important lesson learned regarding the design of the health programs and the contracting of implementing agencies, one that should be considered in future projects designed to eradicate child labor.

90. Local monitoring system component: this component was initially implemented by the project, which hired monitors and recorded the information gathered. The baseline studies used as a reference for the monitoring were contracted to Universidad Rural de Guatemala and Ecodesarrollo (July 2001), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (October 2001), and Redes Consulting Group (December 2001).

91. The implementation mode had two variants. At the beginning, the design proposal was used. For this, project monitors visited the plantations to identify the working children reported in the baseline study, and went to the schools to verify children's attendance. The data and figures compiled by the monitors then were submitted to the national coordination team of the project in order to be recorded and processed so as to be able to issue the needed reports. This mode had very high operating costs and few practical results given the difficulty of finding the children. This was due to the wide extension of the plantations, their geographic dispersion and multiple entrances and exits, as well as to the seasonal nature of the farm-work. These difficulties indicate that the direct information recording about the children found on the plantations is not a reliable indicator, and that it should be replaced by indirect indicators, such as school attendance and others.

92. Given the limited results of this mode, it was decided to adopt a new strategy whose purpose was to detect the children who did not attend school, and who had not been identified in the baseline studies or by the implementing agencies. To do so, monitoring committees comprised by parents and teachers were created. They used the information they gathered themselves as well as that which had been collected by the health promoters who were working as volunteers to visit families in effort to make them aware of the child labor issue. This mode was very effective for focusing on the target population and incorporating them into the project, but it cannot be really considered a monitoring system because: i) data gathering was not systematic; ii) no periodic records or reports were generated that could be used to measure the real progress of the project; iii) no activities were organized to analyze the information; and iv) the data gathered was not useful to make adjustments that could allow for improving the project's effectiveness and efficiency.

93. This mode of focusing on the target population had limited results in paid child labor in Marcovia. These limitations derived from the seasonal hiring, the internal migration of the population, the unsatisfactory dedication and performance of the committee members, and the tactics used by working children to avoid being detected.

²⁵ Rooted plants to be transplanted to commercial plantations

94. In contrast, working children were successfully detected by the agro-industrial companies of Marcovia after they were actively involved in the project. To accomplish this, these companies contributed their resources and the needed organization in order to carry out systematic activities for more than three years. This effort allowed them to guarantee that they had eliminated at least 95% of the working children originally identified. Nevertheless, at the time of this evaluation, the situation of the remaining 5% was uncertain. The methods used by the human resource departments of these companies were to keep computerized records and systematically analyze the identification document numbers²⁶ included in the labor contracts. They also carried out awareness-raising and training activities at four levels: parents, subcontractors, foremen and time-keepers, and other managers in the industry. To complement the training activities they imposed economic and labor sanctions inside the companies that were consistent with the written warnings, levied high fines, and even fired repeaters.

■ Project Team Performance (Organization and operational matters)

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95. This section refers to the performance of the project's organization and the operational procedures used to achieve the objectives; thus, it does not include an evaluation of the staff.

96. The headquarters were located at IPEC's sub-regional office and the project's offices in the intervention areas; when they were closed, the staff was relocated to IPEC's national offices. The team was composed of full-time professionals and administrative staff, as well as part-time administrative staff from IPEC's sub-regional office, for a total of 13 people, who held the following positions:

- i) A chief technical advisor (international expert);
- ii) Two program officers; initially these were two international experts (who were later replaced by a volunteer from UNDP) and a national professional who also worked as the national coordinator of the coffee project in Costa Rica;
- iii) Three part-time administrators from IPEC's sub-regional office in Costa Rica;
- iv) Four national coordinators²⁷;
- v) Three administrative assistants for the national projects.

97. The implementing agencies had their own offices, and every also case had an additional office in the intervention area. The staff assigned to the various action programs varied depending on the intensity of the work.

98. IPEC's Headquarters in Geneva participated as the entity in charge of final approval of the Action Programs designed by the implementing agencies, which had previously been analyzed by the national coordination teams and the sub-regional coordination team. The role of IPEC headquarters, which previously had caused delays of up to one year for the start of some Action Programs, was amended from 2003 by decentralizing the technical approval of Action Programs. This allowed to reduce the time needed for approval processes. Previously, to speed up the start of activities of some programs, the sub-regional coordination team had created "mini-programmes" and "grant agreements" for about US\$ 20,000 or less, which were then approved by ILO's sub-regional office in San José.

99. It should be added that the governments of the participating countries did not formally take part in the analysis of the action programs before their approval, despite the fact that in some cases they contributed a significant number of resources, such as in the case of the education programs in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. This lack of governmental participation in the approval of the projects and, consequently, in their follow-up, did not contribute to their learning about the interventions undertaken in order to eradicate child labor.

100. IPEC's Sub-regional Office in San José: its main interventions consisted of the analysis of the action programs, the administrative and accounting management of the project, the signing of contracts with the implementing agencies, and the disbursement of funds to the implementing agencies. The latter two responsibilities were officially in the hands of ILO's sub-regional office in San José.

101. IPEC's national offices were also of great help for the implementation, since they contributed by means of their relationships with the national governments, and with employers' organizations and

²⁶ To determine the accuracy of the issuing date of the identification documents and verify that they had not been forged.

²⁷ The staff that worked in the project in Nicaragua is included.

workers' unions. In the evaluator's opinion, these offices at all times supported the project, thus facilitating its implementation.

102. The project's sub-regional coordination: Its functions were the following: i) general coordination of the project; ii) appointment of the national coordinators and administrative assistants; iii) analysis and assessment of the action programs; iv) analysis and approval of mini-projects and grant agreements (up to US\$ 20,000); v) approval of financial and activity reports issued by the implementing agencies; vi) consolidation and translation into English of the periodic reports for the donor; vii) communication and dissemination of the project's outcomes.

103. The activity that demanded the most dedication from the sub-regional coordination team and from the national coordination teams was the consolidation and translation of the periodic reports, since in the first period of the project they had to process up to 48 reports a year, 20 corresponding to the Commercial Agriculture project and 28 to the Coffee project. Without doubt, this affected the effectiveness of the project team, as they were processing reports practically half the time of the year.

104. For this evaluation, it is clear that the frequency of the reports is excessive and that it would have been more suitable to issue bi-annual reports, as was established for the second phase of the project, according to the recommendations of the final evaluation of August 2003. Moreover, according to the dynamics of the actions and the achievement of outcomes, it is very unlikely that quarterly and even bi-annual reports will generate relevant information for the donor.

105. This opinion does not include quarterly technical and financial reports from the implementing agencies to the project, because the disbursement of funds is conditioned to the correct utilization of the advance payments and the high technical and financial performance of the agencies.

106. National coordination teams: Their performance has been very satisfactory in general terms. In addition to their actions as the technical and financial supervisors of the implementing agencies, their actions to increase the participation of the target population and to inform national authorities about the project deserve to be mentioned. Another aspect that stands out has been their involvement with local public and private entities to improve the effectiveness of the actions. The exception to this good performance was the melon project in Honduras during its first two years, when it was necessary to replace two national coordinators.

107. Implementing agencies: Overall, their performance may be considered moderately satisfactory, but there are differences among agencies which require the use of a qualitative scale. Performance was not coherent in all cases with their technical capacity, experience, and reputation, but rather depended on the delays in the approval of the action programs and the lack of flexibility in the initial disbursements.

108. The implementing agencies in charge of the action programs in the three intervention areas evaluated were the following:

a) Broccoli in Guatemala:

- i) Awareness and Mobilization: The Journalists' Association of Guatemala (Cooperativa de Periodistas de Guatemala, or COOPEDEGUA), a private entity with headquarters in Guatemala City with no presence in Chilascó; it effectively complied with the activity program.
- ii) Education and Health: Pastoral de la Niñez y la Salud of the Diocese of Verapaz, with prestige and strong presence in the intervention area, as well as a record of effectiveness in program implementation. The Provincial Coordination of Community Services of the Ministry of Education collaborated effectively with this agency for the program's success.
- iii) Income Generation: Municipality of Salamá, a local governmental organization without practical experience in similar programs, but that had the technical assistance of GTZ, which supports it in the decentralization process of public actions.

b) Melon in Honduras:

- i) Education and Awareness (first contract): The Centro de Investigación, Planeamiento y Evaluación (CIPE Consultores) was selected for this program, but the contract was terminated for noncompliance.
- ii) Education and Awareness (second contract): CARE Internacional de Honduras, well-known and prestigious at both the national and international level, was selected in April 2005 to continue the program. The quality of the technical proposal would have allowed for a successful program; unfortunately, the delays in the contract approval prevented it from achieving all the expected outcomes.

- iii) Income Generation: Centro Nacional de Educación Técnica (CENET), a public autonomous entity with national prestige, which is associated with other actions undertaken by ILO in Honduras, was selected at a rather late date (June 2004) to implement the program. Nevertheless, it was possible to identify successful cases, and the incorporation of a Vocational Training for Labor Insertion option proved highly relevant for the eradication of paid child labor in commercial agriculture.
 - iv) Health: Fundación Pueblo a Pueblo (Project HOPE) was in charge of this program, and concluded it close to the expected due date, but the quality of the activities was not as expected by the project.
- c) Tomato in the Dominican Republic:
- i) Awareness and Income Generation: The NGO Hábitat, a prestigious organization in the province of Azua, was in charge of this program. Its performance regarding the awareness-raising activities was very satisfactory since it managed to summon the Federación de Pequeños Productores Agrícolas (FEINCAMAT) and the provincial delegation of the teachers' union (ADP), thus mobilizing the population of the six communities covered. However, in income generation its performance was not satisfactory. This was due to the lack of creativity in productive guidance efforts, and to delays in the loans being granted.
 - ii) Education and Health (first contract): The Instituto de Desarrollo y Salud Integral (INDESUI) was selected to carry out the action program with the highest budget allocated in the project (US\$ 269,490), and its technical performance was acceptable both in education and health. However, they had serious difficulties in coordinating activities with the Provincial Directorate of Health, and also had delays in the disbursements due to both the deficient quality and late presentation of the technical and financial reports issued. Finally, INDESUI decided to leave the Project after it had implemented 68% of the contract (US\$ 183,935).
 - iii) Education (second contract): Visión Mundial of the Dominican Republic completed the implementation of the education activities beginning in April 2005. Thus, very little may be said about Visión Mundial's performance given the short time that it has been in charge of implementing the program.

109. According to the above, the selection of the implementing agencies was not completely satisfactory since only four from the initial seven²⁸ complied correctly with their mission. This indicates that the selection criteria were not adequate. These criteria had not been established in the project design. Nor was the proposed pre-selection respected completely, although this may have occurred because of loss of interest or an excessive workload among the pre-selected agencies. What is evident is that the criteria were not uniform in the three countries. For example, in Honduras the agency originally selected was CIPE Consultants, whose performance was unsatisfactory and whose prestige and capacity are clearly inferior to the one of CARE International, which eventually replaced it.

110. One aspect that indicates some incongruities in the contracting of implementing agencies, and which was acknowledged by both final evaluations, is that the project contracts allowed budget funds to be allocated for direct costs, but not for administrative costs. Thus, these contracts are not very attractive from an economic point of view. Moreover, the financial flow of the programs is clearly unfavorable for the agencies, given the delays in the disbursements. Thus, the contracts signed with the project are only seen as a way to increase the implementing agency's prestige and to learn about how to manage new types of projects. These factors should have been considered at the time of selecting the agencies, in order to give priority to those that were financially solvent, and whose administration was compatible with the demands of IPEC. Doing so would have prevented the withdrawal of agencies that have technical capacity but that are weak economically, financially, and administratively, as happened with INDESUI.

o PERFORMANCE OF THE PROJECT'S PARTNERS

111. Many public and private entities joined the project, all of them making contributions through their participation in the actions and also by means of resources that increased the available budget.

²⁸ The implementing agencies that completed their Action Programmes were the Pastoral for Health and Childhood, the municipality of Salamá and COOPEDEGUA, in Guatemala, as well as HABITAT in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand CIPE Consultants, the HOPE project in Honduras and INDESUI in the Dominican Republic did not complete their contracts.

These entities include governmental institutions, local management structure organizations, employers' associations, and workers' unions. Their performance is assessed below.

▪ Central Government Institutions

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112. The public institutional panorama faced by the project was not very clear, since IPEC's official counterpart is constituted by the National Commissions for the Eradication of Child Labor which were created within the collaboration framework that was established with the participating countries. These commissions, which include at the least the central ministries or state secretariats of labor, education, and health, are political decision-making entities at the highest level which usually do not participate in the project's operational aspects, given the multiplicity of responsibilities of their members.

113. The composition of these national commissions and their usefulness in terms of decision-making and leadership for the project's direction seem to have been taken into account by the design which proposed the creation of more functional Steering Committees of the project. Yet, the integration and functions of these committees were not defined in the project's documents. Nevertheless, during the project's implementation, these committees were not given enough importance, and they were never formally created. The negative results of this failure were the absence of participation on the part of the central governments in the making of decisions, the insufficient appropriation of the intervention methods by the national institutions, and, in some cases, their lack of information about the project.

114. It is worth mentioning that the existence of Steering Committees composed by Government officials could have generated some delays in the implementation, but this evaluation understands that IPEC projects to eradicate child labour should serve to strengthen Governments in this area, specially if we consider the dimension of the problem in the subregion of Central America and the Dominican Republic.

115. Despite all this, the ministries of labor and education learned about and appreciated the project, although some of the officials interviewed²⁹ regretted not having participated formally in the decision-making process. It should be added that in the three countries, there are public entities that specialize in the eradication of child labor, such as the Social Planning directorates of the ministries of labor (in Guatemala and Honduras), and specialized technical units, such as the Technical Unit of Child Labor of Honduras, which is comprised of the Secretariat of Labor, various workers' unions, and the Honduran Council of Private Enterprises (COHEP). In the Dominican Republic, there is the Child Labor Unit of the Undersecretary of Labor, composed by a multidisciplinary team of professionals who specialize in this issue. In this regard, the General Director of Social Planning of Guatemala, said the following:

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We were not invited to participate in the project's direction and decision-making, and I do not find this appropriate because it is impossible for the NGOs in charge of implementing the project to make it sustainable. Our recommendation for IPEC is that the direction and decision-making of the projects should be exercised by the national government, although its implementation may be decentralized to the local governments and NGOs.

116. The ministers of labor participated to a certain extent in the project's direction in that they issued endorsement letters to the selected agencies, yet this seems to have been more a formality related to not objecting to the project than the result of a deep technical evaluation, given the non-compliance of some agencies.

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117. This decision made by the project of not making the participation of governmental institutions formal resulted in some entities that are naturally related to commercial agriculture not taking part. These included the Ministries of Agriculture, even though they do participate in the National Commissions for Child Labor Eradication, and thus also could have contributed to the implementation

²⁹ Mariano Jiménez Talavera, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock of Honduras; Rodolfo Colmenares Arandí, Vice Minister of Employment and Social Planning of Guatemala; Celso Chaclán, Vice Minister of Cross-cultural Bilingual Education of Guatemala; Lilián Sonia Figueroa Sandoval, General Director of Social Planning of Guatemala; Lourdes Armendáez, Subdirector of Social Planning of Honduras; and Ramón Collazo, Director of Rural Organization, Secretariat of Agriculture of the Dominican Republic.

of the three components of the national projects. In this regard, it is mentioned that the State Secretariat of Agriculture of Honduras, which is part of the Technical Council of Strategies for Poverty Reduction, is implementing the Service for Agricultural Education (SEDUCA), with national funds for training. On the other hand, the Secretariat of Agriculture of the Dominican Republic expressed interest in participating in IPEC's projects through the Directorates for Rural Organization and Extension, and in their Rural Development Units in the eight regional Directorates of the Secretariat. Together both Directorates have about 900 field technicians throughout the country that could have contributed to the implementation of the Action Programs and to their monitoring. Moreover, in the Dominican Republic, Banco Agrícola contributed to the project through the modification of their credit policy and the credit regulations of the bank, which excludes producers who use child labor from credit. It is important to note that the bank has 45,916 loan-holders throughout the country and that the bank's experts verify this regulation during periodic visits to the loan holders.

118. We may add to the above that the Ministries of Agriculture are the accepted implementers of rural and agricultural development projects, with national resources as well as resources from international cooperation. Most of them have an income generation component that could achieve better results than similar programs implemented by the project.

119. Nevertheless, the Project obtained the collaboration of the Secretary of Agriculture of Honduras, that was involved in awareness raising and training of agronomists (students and graduates). It also obtained the collaboration of the Banco Agrícola of the Dominican Republic, that modified its credit procedures to exclude producers that hired child labour from their loans.

▪ Regional and Local Government Institutions

120. The project had the support needed from the governmental entities at the regional and local levels, especially from the ministries of education and labor. The support of the former was more important because of the resources in cash and in kind contributed, while in the case of the ministries of labor there was a good deal of collaboration from the regional delegates during the inspections and awareness-raising activities, although the project had to provide the necessary resources due to the limited available budgets of these governmental offices.

121. The local entities of the Ministries of Education that contributed the most to the project were the Provincial Coordination of Community Services of Guatemala and the Azua School District. These entities accepted the introduction of new teaching methodologies such as Active Rural Schools (ARS) and the Homework Rooms, appointed new teachers and facilitated their training, repaired buildings and provided furniture to adapt the schools to the growing number of students, distributed school supplies and scholarships for the children, and also provided offices for the project's operation.

122. Another entity that provided support was the Secretariat of Social Works of the Office of the First Lady (SOSEP) in Guatemala, which contributed to the implementation of community homes for 60 preschool age children.

123. In contrast, there were difficulties in coordinating with the Provincial Directorate of Health of Azua (DPS-AZUA), and the health activities of the INDESUI implementing agency had to be cancelled.

▪ Local Management Structures

124. Two types of local management structures contributed to the project's implementation and to the achievement of the objectives: parents and teachers' committees (or surveillance committees), and the local delegations of the governmental commissions to eradicate child labor.

125. The creation of the parents and teachers' committees may be considered the most important effect of the project, both in terms of the mobilization of the communities in favor of the projects' objectives, and for their efforts carried out in the surveillance committees. These surveillance committees identified working children, and raised the awareness of their families so as to encourage them to withdraw their children from work and to send them to school and to the homework rooms.

126. The most important community mobilization verified by this evaluation took place in Pueblo Viejo, La Bombita, and Tabara Abajo, where between 30 and 40 parents, teachers, and other public officials gathered for the interviews which were held (see Annex). It is interesting to point out that these social mobilization processes were in every case related to the schools.

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127. The delegations of the governmental commissions for the eradication of child labor, such as the Technical Sub-council for the Eradication of Child Labor, Southern Region, Honduras, also contributed to raising the communities' awareness. However, these structures should be considered more as formal entities of involvement than as effective support for the project. The reason for this is that they are very weak structures due to the lack of operating budget and because they are composed of public officials who require a lot of training, who do not remain at their positions for long, and who have other job functions.

▪ Employers

128. Eleven agro-industrial and exporting companies that employed children participated in the project: 7 melon exporters³⁰, 2 sugarcane processing plants³¹, both in the Municipality of Marcovia, Honduras, and 2 tomato paste manufacturers³² in the Province of Azua.

129. The agro-industrial companies of Marcovia, Honduras had a rather indifferent attitude at the beginning of the project, but then they became involved when it was demonstrated to them that the project was benefiting their actions by preventing them from the commercial risks posed by hiring children on their plantations and industrial plants. At the beginning of the project, these companies felt that their interests were being harmed by being prevented from hiring low-cost and good quality labor. Furthermore, they had believed that they were being attacked by the Ministry of Labor, the project itself, and the local government commissions for the eradication of child labor, and they even banned the representatives of these institutions from entering their property. But after the intervention of the Honduran Council of Private Enterprises (COHEP), the Chamber of Commerce the Industry of Choluteca, an official of the customs office of the United States, and the sub-regional and national project's officers, they became aware of the need to eradicate child labor, and finally prohibited hiring underage persons in their enterprises. As already mentioned, eliminating the practice of hiring child workers was not an easy task given the size of the companies, the use of subcontractors to hire employees, and the families' interest in getting jobs for their children. However, these business people set this as a priority in their human resources department tasks, which used several strategies and managed to withdraw 95% of the original working children and stopped exploiting child labor. It is important to stress that the methodology used by the sugarcane processing plants consisted in raising awareness and training families, contractors, foremen, and unit managers while applying sanctions to those who relapsed.

130. The interest and collaboration provided by the Honduran Council of Private Enterprises through its legal advisory unit should be emphasized. The council not only facilitated the interviews of the project's officers with the industrialists of Marcovia, but also carried out an awareness-raising program for its affiliates throughout the country. On the other hand, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Choluteca has been a constant ally of the project by facilitating the local awareness-raising activities.

131. In the contrast, the Dominican industrialists did not feel that the project could hurt their interests since they knew the risk of sanctions to their product exports. Therefore, they participated in a positive manner both by prohibiting the hiring of children and by contributing to the awareness-raising activities and the training to generate income.

▪ Trade unions

132. The participation of trade unions in the project's actions was not significant, except in the case of the Dominican Republic where the national teachers' union (Asociación Dominicana de Profesores, or ADP) and the labor union council (Consejo de Unidad Sindical, or CNUS) organized awareness activities to support the project. ADP and Azua's Regional Office of CNUS were the offices that were most involved in raising their affiliates' awareness. However, the Child Labor Committee of CNUS had no direct participation in the project, but rather organized community activities geared to raising awareness at the national level among the related organizations: the General Workers' Central (CGT), the National Confederation of United Workers (CTU), Confederación Autónoma Sindical Clasista (CASC) and National Confederation of United Dominican Workers (CNTD).

³⁰ SURAGROH, EXCOSUR, AGROGOLFO, MONTELIBANO, ONDEX, COVESUR, and AGROLIBANO.

³¹ La Grecia and La Choluteca.

³² La Famosa and Victorina Industrial.

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133. In Honduras there are six national trade unions, three of which are comprised of workers from the agricultural and cattle sector, and the other three are comprised of workers from other sectors of the economy. Those unions belonging to the former group are the Consejo Coordinador de Organizaciones Campesinas de Honduras³³ (COCOCH) and the Consejo Nacional Campesino³⁴ (CNC), both of which represent self-employed workers, and the Coordinadora de Sindicatos Bananeros y Agroindustriales de Honduras (COSIBAH), to which salaried workers belong. On the other hand, the three labor unions of non-agricultural workers are the Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras (CTH), the Central General del Trabajo (CGT), and the Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras (CUTH).

134. The union entities involved in the prevention of child labor are the official boards or commissions (Comisionados para la Prevención del Trabajo Infantil) which were recently created and which has national and regional jurisdiction. Each commission is composed of regular and alternate members from the six trade unions. The entity in charge of the project's intervention area is the Regional Southern Commission.

135. However, within the project's area there are no farm or cattle workers' unions because the employers' organizations have prevented their creation by using the association measure ("asociaciones solidaristas") established by the employers to respond to their interests and to fight against the organization of the workers in unions. On the other hand, the aforementioned commissioners have not carried out any actions in the project's area because they were only created in mid-2004, and are still in the process of becoming organized. Nevertheless, it is likely that in the near future it will be possible to count on the union's actions to eradicate child labor, since the sub-regional project has proposed supporting the commissions in order to facilitate their organization.

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o PROJECT MANAGEMENT

136. The analysis of the project management includes the mechanisms for decision making, the coordination of the actions and efforts, and the administrative procedures related to the implementation of the investments and the disbursement of funds.

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▪ Decision making

137. Decision-making refers essentially to the selection of the implementing agencies and the approval of the action programs. The mechanisms which had been used for both tasks determined the pace of the project's implementation.

138. The selection of the implementing agencies corresponded to the project's sub-regional coordination based on the recommendations that were made by the national coordinators. In many cases, IPEC's national offices also participated by assessing the recommendations of the national coordinators. This selection was not always made correctly; as a result, the contracts of two out of the eight agencies initially selected had to be terminated because of their inadequate performance.³⁵ The agency selection criteria were not known at the time of this evaluation since the chief technical advisor who worked at the beginning of the project is no longer in charge. Moreover, there are no documents that include the criteria used for the selection.

139. Based on the characteristics of the agencies hired, this evaluation assumes that the aspects considered for their selection were their technical capacity and experience with respect to the core issues of each action program, their presence in the intervention area, and their prestige or reputation. However, the administrative, economic, and financial capacities of the agencies interviewed were not always considered. This is clear since the people from the implementing agencies that were interviewed complained about the administrative demands of IPEC, the impossibility of including administrative expenses in the budgets of the programs, and the delays in the approval of the programs and disbursements.

140. After the selection was made, each of the agencies formulated its own action program and submitted it to the two approval entities, depending of the amount of the contract: i) the proposals

³³ Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras (ANACH) is affiliated to this trade union.

³⁴ Unión Nacional de Campesinos (UNC) and Federación de Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria de Honduras (FECORAH) are affiliated to this trade union.

³⁵ CIPE Consultores and Project HOPE in Honduras and INDESUI in the Dominican Republic

with budgets of up to US\$ 20,000 were approved by the project's sub-regional coordinator and IPEC's sub-regional office in San José; ii) when the budget exceeded US\$ 20,000, the final ruling was made by IPEC/Geneva, prior to intervention of the project's sub-regional coordination team and IPEC's sub-regional office, both located in San José. Recently, IPEC's regional office in Lima was included as a new entity in this process. Thus, making the needed decisions took excessively long periods, which in some cases lasted more than a year.

141. It is worth mentioning that from 2003, IPEC decentralized the technical approval process of the Action Programs, shortening the period for approvals. Nevertheless, the financial economic approval of Action Programs could not be modified since it corresponds to the ILO offices³⁶ and requires at least a month.

Administrative and Disbursement Procedures

142. After approving the action programs, the disbursements were made to the agencies, sometimes through a single payment (grants and mini-projects of up to US\$ 5,000), or through an advanced payment and successive payments, which was the procedure applied in the action programs.

143. The disbursement mechanism of an advance payment for the action programs (usually US\$ 20,000) was not fast enough if it is compared to their duration (18 months), since each one took between three and four months. The step by step sequence included: i) approval by the procurement office headquartered in Geneva; ii) preparation of the contract by IPEC's sub-regional office in San José, and submittal by private courier to the agency;³⁷ iii) the opening of a bank account to transfer the money to, and submission of the contract signed by the implementing agency; iv) issuing of the transfer or bank draft. The last step was originally carried out by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) from San José, but it was then effected directly by ILO sub-regional office in San José. This turned out to be more expedient, as it avoided the need for a financial operation out of the direct control of IPEC.

144. For the disbursements after the advance payment, the implementing agency had to present quarterly financial and activity reports, and an estimate of the expenses projected for the following quarter. This information was evaluated by the project's sub-regional coordination team, and by the administrative department of IPEC's sub-regional office in San José. After these elements had been approved, ILO's sub-regional office in San José made the transfer to the bank account of the implementing agency. This procedure to make the transfers occasioned delays of up to four months when the financial reports had errors, these usually deriving from the lack of knowledge on the part of the agency regarding ILO's internal audit norms. In these cases, the reports were returned to the agency for their correction and later re-submission. It should also be added that when the funds to be transferred amounted to US\$ 50,000 or more, the UNDP transfer was made from its headquarters in New York, with the resulting delays. This was later solved by IPEC, as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

145. Since mid-2004, ILO introduced a measure for speeding up the disbursement of the funds, a measure which is known as IMPREST. This consists of having the national coordination teams prepare their monthly estimates of payments to be made to the agencies in advance, and then sending them for their approval to the project's sub-regional coordinator. After their approval, the ILO sub-regional office instructs the ILO regional office in Lima to transfer the funds. They are then transferred to the bank account of IPEC's national office, which pays the expenses approved directly to the implementing agencies. This procedure was applied in the tomato project in the Dominican Republic, and has significantly sped up the payments; IMPREST should be used in the other countries as well.

Budget and Financial Implementation

146. The project's financial implementation³⁸ (Table 5) amounted to US\$3,683,150, equivalent to 92% of the budget in the design (US\$3,987,282), a proportion that was satisfactory if it is considered

³⁶ Established in the Programme Operations Manual of the ILO

³⁷ The contract is composed of the main text and 10 annexes

³⁸ National projects of Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic and 75% of the sub-regional project

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that the contributions from Governments and other partners³⁹ were reduced almost to half, in relation with what was previewed in the design of the National Projects. In contrast, the financial implementation of USDOL resources slightly exceeded the budgeted amount (by 1.7%)⁴⁰ probably due to the differences in the exchange rate and banks costs.

147. The financial implementation per component shows that only 33% of the total funds invested corresponded to direct actions involving the target group, while the remaining resources were used in the sub-regional project (25%), the national coordination offices (40%), and the baselines and monitoring (2%).

Table 5. Financial Implementation of Subregional Project's (75%) and National Projects
- in USD -

COMPONENT	FINANCIAL EXECUTION (US\$)			TOTAL	
	USDOL	Governments	Other Partners	US\$	%
Subregional Coordination (75%)	829.126			829.126	25%
National Coordinations	1.328.228			1.328.228	40%
Action Programs	1.075.057	400.000		1.475.057	33%
Baseline/Monitoring	50.739			50.739	2%
TOTAL	3.283.150 89%	400.000 11%	0 0%	3.683.150 100%	100%

Source: Prepared from the accounting data of IPEC's Subregional Office

148. The project was funded almost entirely with the resources provided by USDOL (89%), while the governments contributed only 11% (an estimated amount) and the contributions of the other partners were not significant.

149. The comparison between the budget and the implementation per component (Table 6) shows that the cost of the national coordination staff operations increased by 31%, while the investment in the action programs decreased by just 21%. On the other hand, the financial implementation of the child-labor monitoring systems only amounted to 19% of the budget.

150. The increase in the costs of the national coordination teams was due to the duplication of the implementation term (from 30 to 59 months), and was financed with the balances available from the child-labor monitoring component and, to a smaller extent, by the action programs. Despite the extension of the implementation term, the costs for the sub-regional coordination efforts did not increase. This is attributed to the attempts which were to reduce costs, and to some costs that were co-financed with the Project for Eradication of Child Labor in Coffee Production.

Table 6. Comparison of the Budget and the Implementation
- in US\$ -

COMPONENT	Budgeted (US\$)	Executed (US\$)	Difference	
			(US\$)	%
Subregional Coordination (75%)	841.876	829.126	12.750	98%
National Coordinations	1.013.991	1.328.228	-314.237	131%
Action Programs	1.857.395	1.475.057	382.338	79%
Baseline/Monitoring	274.020	50.739	223.281	19%
TOTAL	3.987.282	3.683.150	304.132	92%

Source: Prepared from the accounting data of IPEC Subregional Office

151. Another aspect analyzed was the financial implementation up to August 2005 of the resources contributed by USDOL for the action programs, and the grant agreements contracted with the implementing agencies. Table 7 shows that only 80% of the amounts contracted were implemented, although the situation was otherwise in the three national projects evaluated.

³⁹ The governmental contribution of US\$ 400,000 was estimated for this evaluation, but there are no records of these contributions

⁴⁰ USDOL contribution in the original design is US\$ 3,237,947, while the one reported in the financial implementation amounts to US\$ 3,283,150.

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152. The amount implemented was almost optimal in Guatemala (96%), but insufficient in the Dominican Republic (77%). There, the coordination difficulties with the Provincial Directorate of Health of Azua and the later withdrawal of INDESUI left 32% of the funds of that program without being implemented, so it was necessary to hire Visión Mundial to complete the education activities.

153. On the other hand, in Honduras the financial implementation of the action programs was even lower (70%), because of the termination of the contracts with CIPE Consultants and Project HOPE, and due to the late beginning of the contracts with CENET and CARE Internacional de Honduras.

Table 7. Financial Implementation of USDOL Contribution to the Action programs
- in US\$ -

PROJECT	ACTION PROGRAM		DISBURSEMENT DATE		DURATION (months)		AMOUNT		
	Name	Executing Agency	Start	End	Expected	Real	Approved	Executed	%
Broccoli in Guatemala	Productive Options	Municipality of Salamá	Jul-2002	Nov-2004	18	29	184.000	179.430	98%
	Education and Health	Pastoral Diocese Verapaz	Feb-2002	Oct-2004	18	33	165.966	157.667	95%
	Social Awareness	COOPEDEGUA	May-2002	Oct-2002	8	6	17.440	16.568	95%
	Subtotal Broccoli in Guatemala			Feb-2002	Nov-2004	18	34	367.406	353.665
Melon in Honduras	Education/Awareness	CIPE Consultores	Oct-2002	suspended	18	6	127.500	20.000	16%
	Health	Proyecb HOPE	Oct-2002	May-2004	15	20	27.300	25.214	92%
	Occupational Training	CENET (1)	Jun-2004	Aug-2004	3	3	15.000	15.000	100%
		CENET (2)	Feb-2005	Sept-2005	9	9	127.324	120.513	95%
	Education/Awareness	CARE Int. - Honduras (3)	Feb-2004	Apr-2004	3	3	5.000	2.800	56%
		CARE Int. - Honduras (4)	Jul-2004	Sept-2004	3	3	15.000	13.712	91%
Subtotal Melon in Honduras			Apr-2005	unfinished	6	unfinished	100.328	95.312	95%
							417.452	292.551	70%
Tomato in R. Dominicana	Awareness/Productive Opt.	Habitat	Sept-2002	Feb-2005	16	30	201.727	167.110	83%
	Education and Health	INDESUI	Sept-2002	Oct-2004	16	27	269.490	183.935	68%
	Education	Visión Mundial - RD	Apr-2005	Jun-2005	3	5	87.193	77.797	89%
	Subtotal Tomato in the Dominican Republic							558.410	428.842
Total Projects Guatemala, Honduras, and Dominican Rep.							1.343.268	1.075.057	80%

(1) Grant agreement

(2) The action program is about to end; it is only necessary to identify and train 200 beneficiaries.

(3) Mini-project

(4) Grant agreement

(5) Action program

Coordination of the Actions

154. This task was assigned to the sub-regional coordinator and the national consultants, but it was not always possible to carry it out effectively because of the delays in the approval of the action programs, the initial delays in the payments to the implementing agencies, the difficulties in the coordination with some public entities, and the termination of some contracts with the agencies. All these barriers caused a gap among programs, which negatively impacted the effectiveness of the actions.

155. In this evaluator's opinion, the most negative situations took place in the Dominican Republic and Honduras. In the first case, INDESUI could not coordinate with the Provincial Directorate of Health of Azua (DPS-AZUA) of the State Secretariat of Public Health and Social Attention (SESPAS), and so the activities scheduled had to be suspended. In Honduras, it was necessary to cancel the education program only a short while after it had started, and the income generation component just recently started, in February 2005. This lack of coordination among programs was discovered by this evaluator because of the comments from the beneficiaries, such as a group of women who were being trained at CENET, who complained that their children never had received school supplies, and that since their poverty did not make it possible to purchase them, their children were having difficulties in school.

156. On the other hand, the best coordination among the programs took place in Guatemala, where the programs started almost simultaneously, and the education and health actions were implemented by the same agency.

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o PROJECT SYNERGIES

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157. The Project managed to interest some governments and NGOs to make unexpected economic contributions to the design; this will certainly improve the results achieved.

158. In Honduras, through the intervention of the project's sub-regional coordination team, the National Council for the Poverty Eradication Strategy made a contribution for CENET to continue supporting the micro-entrepreneurs of the action program in Marcovia. This contribution would amount to US\$ 476,000 for two years of implementation, and the resources come from the country's external (foreign) debt having been written off.

159. In the Dominican Republic, Plan Internacional, a prestigious NGO with international and national activities, is interested in continuing the project's efforts in 10 communities in Azua with its own funds. These communities include the six that were covered by the project, and four new communities yet to be selected. The actions have still not begun, but they are expected to start soon. The budget for this intervention was not made available for this evaluation.

2. EFFECTIVENESS

160. This section describes the outcomes of the project (its effects and products), the effectiveness of the investments, and the perspectives and prospects for their sustainability.

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161. First, the section refers to the conditions in the context that influenced the implementation and the achievement of the outcomes, and that in this case were very important for the national projects.

o CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION

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162. The context in which the project was developed was very favorable, in general terms, especially as it has been influenced by the progress made in the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) and growing social investment in Guatemala. Some unfavorable elements are the stagnation of the economy in the sub-region as a result of the economic recession in the United States of America, which is the main destination for the exports of the sub-region, and the crisis in coffee prices, which affected all the countries in the sub-region.

163. A contextual element whose influence on the agriculture-industrial entrepreneurs was decisive was the progress in the implementation of the DR-CAFTA between the United States, the Central American countries, and the Dominican Republic. This agreement, which penalizes the exports of products produced with the use of child labor, was a very important factor for generating a change of attitude among employers who had exploited children through such hiring practices. These same entrepreneurs later became involved in the national projects.

164. Another contextual element that favored the project's implementation in Guatemala was the growing social investment in that country which has been carried out in order to be able to comply with the peace agreements reached. One of the destinations of this social investment was the creation of the Scholarships for Peace; these grants are aimed at promoting elementary schooling nationwide. The timely intervention of the project's national coordination allowed priority to be given to the Mixed Rural School in Chilascó so as to obtain an important number of scholarships on a fairly steady basis from the beginning of the project.

165. Another favorable aspect was that no major natural disasters, so common in the sub-region, occurred in the intervention area, as this could have interrupted the project's actions.

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o EFFECTS AND PRODUCTS

166. The number of effects and products resulting from the project exceeded those expected in the design. However, some weaknesses in the design and the implementation did not allow for achieving the expected qualitative results, especially those related to their sustainability.

167. Nevertheless, this evaluation considers that the project was *effective* since it achieved most of the effects and products included in the development objective, as well as in the immediate objectives.

168. Below is a description of the most relevant effects and products that correspond both to the sub-regional project and to the national projects.

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▪ Outcomes of the Subregional Project

169. The products expected in the Logical Framework and those really achieved were the following:

170. Specific Objective 1: "Effective implementation of four national projects in commercial agriculture in Central America and the Dominican Republic." This objective, whose indicator reads "timely implementation with growing efficiency," included four main products, whose achievement is described below.

a) "The national projects are implemented and operational." This product was achieved since the national objectives were implemented and did function, even though the implementation term (60 months) was twice as long as originally planned (24 to 30 months). In addition, the

- duplication of the implementation term brought about a reduction in the overall efficiency of the project.
- b) *"The capacity of the implementing agencies and collaborators to eradicate child labor in commercial agriculture has been strengthened."* This product was also achieved because workshops were organized and technical assistance was provided so as to be able to train the agencies in aspects of design and implementation from the beginning of the actions;
 - c) *"A local child-labor monitoring system is designed and adapted to the needs of each national project."* Most of the activities corresponding to this product were carried out, including the baseline studies that were undertaken, the local systems that were designed, and the hiring and training of child-labor inspectors and monitors; moreover, their implementation was supervised. However, the outcomes of the system were not those expected because the monitors had difficulties in measuring the indicators effectively, and so the system was discontinued. When it was replaced in Chilascó and Azua, local committees were created to follow up on the children that were withdrawn from working situations or prevented from engaging in labor, and to identify new working children. The follow-up of the provision of services was delegated to the national coordinators;
 - d) *"Indicators are developed and validated for each national project."* This product was only partially achieved because each national project set indicators according to its own activities. However, a specific analysis of these indicators and their effectiveness to measure the eradication of child labor was not carried out. Nor were indicators defined in order to be able to measure the effectiveness of the income generation, health, and awareness-raising programs.

171. Specific Objective 2: *"At the end of the project, there will be a database for the eradication of child labor in commercial agriculture in the sub-region"*.

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The indicators of this objective were: i) information about child labor in commercial and industrial agriculture in the sub-region to be made accessible for the implementers, collaborators, the donor, and others involved; ii) availability of the project's documented experiences; iii) other institutions able to replicate the interventions of the project; and iv) number of visitors to the Web page.

The products expected for this objective were:

- a) *"A report about child labor in commercial agriculture in the sub-region is to be prepared and widely distributed."* This product was fully achieved since several publications, awareness-raising workshops, training activities, awareness-raising campaigns in the media, and videos about child labor in commercial agriculture in the subregion, and about the actions and experiences of the project, were all prepared. The products of this objective were the following:
 - i) Publications
 - "Reporte sobre el Trabajo Infantil en la Agricultura Comercial," [Report on child labor in commercial agriculture], 2003.
 - "El Programa OIT-IPEC," [ILO-IPEC Program], descriptive brochure of the Project Eradication of Child Labor in Commercial Agriculture, 2003;
 - "Trabajo Infantil en la Agricultura en Cifras," [Child labor in Agriculture in Figures], statistical pamphlet of the subregion, 2003;
 - "Fichas de Seguridad y Salud del Trabajo Infantil Peligroso en Tomate, Brócoli, Melón, Café y Flores" [Safety and Health Card of Dangerous Child Labor in Tomato, Broccoli, Melon, Coffee, and Flowers] that describe the risks, effects on health, preventive and corrective measures, 2003;
 - "Cuatro Años Sembrando Esperanzas," [Four Years Planting Hope], descriptive pamphlets of the national projects with case descriptions, 2004;
 - "Sembrando un Mejor Futuro," [Planting a Better Future], publication about the Active Rural School, methodology implemented in the broccoli and coffee projects, 2004;
 - "Ecos del Campo", [Echoes from the Field], two informative brochures, 2005;
 - "Manual para la Formación de Formadores en Trabajo Infantil Peligroso en la Agricultura", [Manual for the training trainers on dangerous child labor in agriculture], 2005
 - ii) Workshops and Seminars
 - Subregional Workshop of Awareness about Child Labor for Rural Union Representatives and Agricultural and Cattle Raisers in Central America and the Dominican Republic. Tegucigalpa, Honduras, September 2003;
 - Three forums on child labor in agriculture, in Nicaragua, October 2003;

- Forum on child labor in agriculture, in the Dominican Republic, November 2003;
 - Participation in the Workshop for Parliament Members of Central America and the Dominican Republic Regarding Bills in Progress, related to child labor, March 2004;
 - Five forums on child labor in agriculture in the Dominican Republic, April/May 2004;
 - Subregional Workshop on Dangerous Child Labor in Agriculture: Validation of the Manual for Training Trainers about Dangerous Child Labor in Agriculture. CATIE, Turrialba, Costa Rica, July 2004;
 - Workshops to present and discuss the Report on Child Labor in Commercial Agriculture, December 2004.
- iii) Subregional awareness-raising campaign (the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Honduras) about child labor in agriculture, with about 50 articles published in the main national press, May 2005;
- iv) Videos
- “El Futuro en Surco Ajeno”, [The future in someone else’s plot], 2003;
 - “Ya no trabajo, mi estudio vale más”, [I don’t work anymore; my schooling is worth more], April 2005.
- b) “A Web page is designed, posted, and regularly updated.” The web page of the Project was established mid 2005. It is part of the Web site of the Regional Office of ILO-IPEC in <http://www.oit.org.pe/ipec>, although it can also be accessed through the Subregional office Website <http://web.oit.or.cr>, the address of the website is <http://www.oit.org.pe/ipec/pagina.php?seccion=42&pagina=108>. The heading of the page corresponds to the Commercial Agriculture and Coffee website, jointly, and there is also a specific section for the Commercial Agriculture project with summaries of the project documents, systematization, evaluation, national studies, statistics, manuals and campaigns, there are no pictures.

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■ Outcomes of the National Projects

172. The consolidated effects of the national projects are summarized in Table 8, which shows degrees of compliance with the goals that are close to, or over 100% for the development objective and for all ActionP, with the exception of the credit loan since that was suspended by instructions from the donor. This allows us to assess the project as *Effective*, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter.

173. It should be added that the goals considered in order to be able to calculate the degree of compliance are those which were proposed by the action programs, and not those in the national project design documents. It should also be pointed out that some of the former goals are higher or wider in scope than those in the project design.

174. An indicator that was not included in the documents of the national projects was school failure. It’s average goal for the projects in Chilascó and Azua was 7%⁴¹. This goal was largely exceeded (203%), with an average school failure of 3% at the time of this evaluation. This is all the more remarkable considering the initial situation, when school failure averaged 11%. This indicator is very relevant for assessing the schooling proposed by the Project. It is more accurate than enrollment figures, and it is also more illustrative of the eradication of child labor, if we consider that working children are characterized by their failure in school. This indicator was not considered in the project in Marcovia.

175. The results of the health action programs were also satisfactory, and the degree of compliance reached 97% in relation to the goal of the Action Programs. On the other hand, health care for families reached 178% of the goal.

176. Finally, the income generation programs reached the goal related to the number of persons trained, but the number of families and people that received loans was only 25% of the expected goal. This was due to the interruption of the credit programs resulting from donor’s restrictions.

177. Nevertheless, since these indicators do not accurately define the results of the income generation programs, they do not describe how many families were successful enough in their

⁴¹ Summary Schemes of the Education Action Programs in Guatemala (Pastoral for Children and Health) and the Dominican Republic (INDESUI)

businesses to be able manage to earn enough income in order for the eradication of child labor to become economically sustainable.

[178.](#) Another aspect that may be noticed in Table 8 is that it was relevant to extend the project to August 2005, because this allowed the goals of the action programs to be met in education and income generation, whose degree of compliance up until August 2003 was clearly insufficient.

[179.](#) The individual outcomes of the national projects are presented in Table 9, where it is possible to note that the best quantitative performance of the education programs were those of the Dominican Republic, followed by Guatemala, and to a lesser degree, Honduras. In contrast, the quantitative effects of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala were similar for the reduction of school failure, thanks to the introduction of new teaching methodologies that improved the quality of education, and that have also had a relevant illustrative effect in the respective national contexts.

Table 8. Effects of the Project Achieved by the National Projects

OBJECTIVE/INDICATOR	GOAL		GOAL COMPLIANCE						
	Unit	Design	Programs	August 2003		August 2005		TOTAL	
		n°	n°	n°	%	n°	%	n°	%
<u>Development Objective</u>									
Niños retirados y prevenidos	Children	8.500	9.543	9.613	101%	1.568	16%	11.181	117%
. Withdrawn	Children	2.745	2.745	1.819	66%	1.200	44%	3.019	110%
. Prevented	Children	6.540	7.583	8.623	114%	518	7%	9.141	121%
<u>Education</u>									
Children enrolled in school	Children	3.200	3.300	1.873	57%	1.303	39%	3.176	96%
School Failure	%	---	7%	12%	58%	3%	206%	3%	206%
Adolescents with occupational training	n°	320	325	283	87%	53	16%	336	103%
<u>Health</u>									
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents	Children	2.420	8.720	1.691	19%	327	4%	2.018	23%
Families	families	750	750	662	88%	0	0%	662	88%
<u>Income Generation Alternatives</u>									
. Training	n°	1.050	1.050	529	50%	480	46%	1.009	96%
. Credit	n°	0	0	71	7%	188	18%	259	25%

Source: Prepared from the data in the reports to the Donor until March 2005 (the last report was not read by the evaluator).

180. The Active Rural School methodology introduced in the mixed rural school of Chilascó resulted in an increase in the enrollment from 350 students in 2002 to 805 in 2005. To handle this increasing number of students, it was necessary to instate an afternoon session. On the other hand, in the six communities included in the project in the Dominican Republic, 75 homework rooms operate, which now attend to 1,405 children on daily basis from the 7 participating schools who passed their courses, also thanks to this program.

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181. This program included occupational training for the adolescents who were withdrawn from labor activities or prevented from working in agriculture. The mode used by the implementing agencies in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic was to enroll these youngsters in technical schools that provide basic education and technical training. In the Dominican Republic, there were some difficulties because the Instituto de Formación Técnica (INFOTEC) [Institute of Technical Training] does not accept adolescents who have not completed their elementary education. Nevertheless, the program achieved the goals that had been originally set.

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Table 9. Effects of the National Projects

OBJECTIVE/INDICATOR	Unit	GOAL		August 2003		August 2005		TOTAL	
		Design	Programs	n°	%	n°	%	n°	%
		n°	n°	n°	%	n°	%	n°	%
PROJECT GUATEMALA									
Development Objective									
Withdrawn and prevented children	NNA	1.000	1.100	1.021	93%	16	1%	1.037	94%
Withdrawn	NNA	785	785	829	106%	16	2%	845	108%
Prevented	NNA	1.000	1.100	1.021	93%	150	14%	1.171	106%
Education									
Children enrolled in school	NNA	1.000	1.100	1.021	93%	16	1%	1.037	94%
School failure	%	n/a	3.4%	9.0%	38%	3.0%	113%	3.0%	113%
Adolescents with occupational training	n°	120	120	113	94%	21	18%	134	112%
Health									
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents	NNA	1.220	1.220	1.583	130%	0	0%	1.583	130%
Families	familias	250	250	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Income Generation Alternatives									
Training	n°	250	250	250	100%	0	0%	250	100%
Credit	n°	n/a	n/a	71	28%	0	0%	71	28%
PROJECT HONDURAS									
Development Objective									
Withdrawn and prevented children	NNA	1.200	1.200	2.349	196%	646	54%	2.995	250%
Withdrawn	NNA	960	960	192	20%	577	60%	769	80%
Prevented	NNA	240	240	2.157	899%	69	29%	2.226	928%
Education									
Children enrolled in school	NNA	1.200	1.200	54	5%	680	57%	734	61%
School failure	%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Adolescents with occupational training	n°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Health									
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents	NNA	1.200	1.200	0	0%	327	27%	327	27%
Families	familias	500	500	662	132%	0	0%	662	132%
Income Generation Alternatives									
Training	n°	500	500	0	0%	155	31%	155	31%
Credit	n°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
PROJECT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC									
Development Objective									
Withdrawn and prevented children	NNA	6.300	7.243	6.243	86%	906	13%	7.149	99%
Withdrawn	NNA	1.000	1.000	798	80%	607	61%	1.405	141%
Prevented	NNA	5.300	6.243	5.445	87%	299	5%	5.744	92%
Education									
Children enrolled in school	NNA	1.000	1.000	798	80%	607	61%	1.405	141%
School failure	%	0	10.0%	14.0%	71%	3.5%	286%	3.5%	286%
Adolescents with occupational training	n°	200	205	170	83%	32	16%	202	99%
Health									
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents	NNA	6.300	7.243	108	1%	0	0%	108	1%
Families	familias	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Income Generation Alternatives									
Training	n°	300	300	279	93%	325	108%	604	201%
Credit	n°	n/a	n/a	0	0%	188	63%	188	63%

Source: Prepared from the data in the reports to the Donor until March 2005⁴².

⁴² The last report was not read by the evaluator.

182. The most successful health program in quantitative terms was that of Guatemala, probably because the implementing agency was the same one that implemented the education program, and also because of its suitable ability and experience. A notable qualitative aspect in Chilascó was the disappearance of the cases of typhoid fever which has existed before the intervention, thanks to the integration and training of a team of 50 volunteer health promoters who promoted preventive measures among the population, in addition to other efforts. The low quantitative results in the other projects were due to difficulties with the implementing agencies, and to a lack of coordination with the regional health institutions.

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183. The Health Programme in the Dominican Republic also had successful results, since until 2003, 90% of the target boys and girls had been attended, through anthropometric studies and distribution of vitamins and debugs. In addition, 421 families from the children target group had been trained in various health matters.

184. The income generation program characteristics were related to each regional project. In Guatemala, there was a careful selection of the micro-enterprise initiatives which resulted in a large number of successful cases. It seems that the training and funding programs were structured according to the demands of the given business type. The executor was the Municipality of Salamá, which both subcontracted the training activities with other specialized entities and granted 71 loans. In order to be able to process and grant the loans, they created a trust fund at BANRURAL. Yet, the trust was cancelled because the project decided to eliminate this component, which created unexpected additional costs.

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185. In Honduras, the income generation component started recently—in June 2004—and included training, as well as delivery of non-refundable seed capital, but did not include granting loans. Thus, the prospects for achieving satisfactory results were not very encouraging. However, the project carried out negotiations with the Advisory Council on the Poverty Reduction Strategy,⁴³ and got additional funds for the CENET implementing agency of US\$ 476,000. Thus, CENET was able to continue the program for two years in order to complete the training efforts and to provide technical assistance to the micro-entrepreneurs that require it. It should be added that the achievement rate of the goals as shown in the table (31%) is much lower than the real results since the data correspond to March 2005; the information furnished by the CENET technicians indicates that the achievement in training is actually close to 80%.

186. The income generation program in the Dominican Republic exceeded the training goals (by 201%), despite the difficulties with INFOTEC mentioned earlier, and the program also granted 188 loans, for a total of US\$54,000, which at the time of the evaluation were being repaid (50% thus far) so as to comply with the instructions of IPEC and the donor. However, it seems that the businesses promoted were not selected adequately since several are small food preparation kitchens or diners in the local communities, or agricultural product stores with few real prospects. The interruption of the funds is causing difficulties in the cash flow of some micro-enterprises.

187. The awareness-raising program and other activities in this line of sub-regional coordination, along with the national coordination team efforts aimed at generating social mobilization processes, are the elements with the best outcomes. This was evident for this evaluation since many public and private entities with national and local jurisdiction which were interviewed stated that they knew about the program and were willing to support actions to eradicate child labor. These entities include the governmental institutions that have been listed throughout this report. The private organizations include Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP), Cámara de Industria y Comercio de Choluteca, Federación de Campesinos Independientes Mamá Tingó⁴⁴ (FEINCAMAT), Consejo de la Unidad Sindical of the Dominican Republic⁴⁵ (CNUS), Asociación Dominicana de Profesores (ADP) and the workers' organizations of Honduras⁴⁶. It should be pointed out that COHEP is already implementing an awareness-raising and training program for its affiliates, and that CNUS has held a dissemination and awareness-raising campaign for the eradication of child labor by using graphs and other visual materials.

188. Social mobilization in the communities where the project was implemented was carried out on a massive basis, especially in the Dominican Republic, where this evaluation interviewed three associations of parents, with more than 40 persons at each interview session. In Guatemala and

⁴³ Cancellation of the National External Debt

⁴⁴ This includes 45 associations of producers for a total of 2,700 affiliates

⁴⁵ This includes CGT, CTU, CASC, and CNTD

⁴⁶ CTH, CGT, CUTH, COCOCH, CNC, and COSIBAH

Honduras, very relevant social mobilization processes took place. As a result of these social processes, several surveillance community committees were created (6 in Azua and 1 in Chilascó), which in the evaluator’s opinion, will be sustainable as long as they maintain some contact with IPEC’s national offices. Moreover, the local organizations and the implementing agencies joined the ad hoc networks; however, this evaluation did not find out about any activities promoted by them.

189. An innovative activity developed in Honduras and with potential for the eradication of child labour were the workshops of awareness raising and training to students and graduates of the agronomical studies of the University Regional Center of the Atlantic and the Autonomous National University of Honduras (CURLA-UNAH)

o UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES

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190. The Project achieved other effects not included in the design. The following are stressed because of their relevance:

- a) A notable reduction of school failure took place in Chilascó and Azua, thanks to the introduction of innovative and effective teaching methodologies.
- b) The training of teachers and facilitators for the Active Rural School (18 teachers), homework and study rooms was carried out with 44 facilitators, as well as the program EDUCATODOS (with 16 facilitators).
- c) The participation of women in community activities for monitoring child labor and the support of the project has been significant, to the point that several community initiatives have been led by women. This has resulted in women being better appreciated in their community roles, something not anticipated by the design.
- d) Upon the project’s request, the National Literacy Commission (CONALFA) of Guatemala included the issue of child labor in their literacy programs.
- e) The recreational activities of the homework rooms in Azua gave rise to the Folk Dance Group of Youngsters “Mangulina” in La Bombita and the Young People’s Theater Group of Tabara Abajo, which promote the eradication of child labor in their performances.
- f) The needed modification of the contracts to plant tomato in the agricultural industries of Azua was brought about; these contracts now include a clause about the “prohibition of using child labor.”
- g) The modification of the loan regulations of Banco Agrícola in the Dominican Republic was effected which established that a producer that hires children will not be eligible for credit.
- h) The intention of the NGO Plan Internacional of the Dominican Republic was stated to continue the project’s implementation in the communities of Azua and in four new communities as yet to be selected, using the project’s methodology.
- i) The construction of the library of the mixed rural school of Chilascó was carried out with resources donated by the electric company of Chilascó.

191. This evaluation detected only one unexpected negative effect: the economic and financial difficulties already being experienced by some micro-enterprises promoted by the project, and which will probably reduce the credibility of the participating entities.

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o EFFICIENCY

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192. The project’s efficiency anticipated in the design⁴⁷ was low, as it would have been necessary to have US\$ 2,129,887 for operational expenses in order to be able to invest US\$1,857,395 in the target group; that is, US\$1.15 of expenses per dollar invested in the beneficiaries, with an efficiency of 47%.

193. However, these amounts later changed during the implementation, and it was necessary to spend US\$2,208,093 in operation costs so as to invest US\$1,475,057 in the target group,⁴⁸ that is, US\$1.50 of expenses per dollar invested in the target group. This meant that the project’s efficiency fell to 40%, or 15% lower than expected.

194. There were essentially three reasons that determined this reduction in the project’s efficiency:

⁴⁷ Considering all sources of funds and the budget of the national projects of Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, plus 75% of the sub-regional project

⁴⁸ The funding of the governments and other partners was estimated at US\$400,000, as there are no complete records of such contributions.

- a) An unfortunate selection of three implementing agencies;⁴⁹ these did not complete their action programs, and that had to be replaced, or, on the other hand, the program investments were lower than the amounts contracted for;
- b) Serious delays in the approval of the action programs caused setbacks in the beginning and in the implementation term of the project, which increased from 24 and 30 months to 60 months. As a result of these delays, up until August 2005 only 805 of the resources of USDOL-IPEC contracted with the agencies had been implemented.⁵⁰ In addition, the expenses for the national coordination teams and the sub-regional coordination exceeded by US\$301,487 (16%) those which had been anticipated in the project design.⁵¹ This increase in the expenses was financed with the balance of the child-labor monitoring budget (US\$ 223,281) and with a part from cost increment (Line 71 of the Budget of the Project).
- c) The financial contributions originally committed by governments and other partners to the project decreased about US\$ 350,000.

195. The analysis of these reasons obliges one to take under consideration a revision of the methodology for selecting the implementing agencies, a review of the procedures for approving the action programs, and also a strategy to guarantee the financial contributions of the governments and other partners.

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196. Another aspect to consider is that the administrative and financial management of the project was adequate, since an effort was made to reduce the project's coordination and operation expenses. If this reduction in the expenses had not been made, the overall efficiency would have been reduced even further due to the duplication of the implementation term.

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o SUSTAINABILITY

197. The project's sustainability is analyzed by taking four elements into consideration: i) institutional sustainability, ii) social sustainability, iii) economic sustainability, and iv) exit strategy.

198. **Institutional Sustainability:** the participation of national public and private institutions in the directorate was part of the rationale and strategy of the project.⁵² However, the implementation failed to create the expected committees, and this has reduced the probability for the national institutions to continue to effectively deal with the issues related to labor, education, health, fighting poverty, awareness-raising, and training of the employer and worker organizations in the intervention areas. In addition, the institutional learning that could have been generated by the project through the Direction Committees in order to replicate similar interventions was not achieved. Moreover, the systematization and dissemination of the lessons learned have been insufficient.

199. **Social Sustainability:** The social mobilization generated in the intervention area has been, undoubtedly, one of the best results of the project. This ensures that the communities will keep a vigilant attitude so as to be able to prevent and eradicate child labor, at least in the medium term. It is possible that after some years pass, this attitude might lose strength and momentum given the changes in the family life and eventual migrations. Therefore, it would be appropriate for the national offices, whether directly or through national institutions, to make an effort to involve the communities in new activities and efforts in order to help them maintain this attitude.

200. **Economic Sustainability:** The limited success of the income generation programs has not allowed a significant number of families to overcome their condition of poverty, a condition which in part originated child labor. These inadequate results make one question the sustainability perspective on preventing child labor, since there is a possibility that given extreme situations of insufficient income, the families might decide to send their children back to work. This aspect is closely related to the lack of institutional sustainability because it is probable that the entities involved in these action programs might lose interest in the intervention areas and might not continue their fight against poverty.

201. **Exit Strategy:** Although three factors will contribute to the sustainability of the actions and effects (the continuity of CENET in Marcovia, the probable incorporation of Plan Internacional in Azua, and the renewal of the Scholarships for Peace in Chilascó), it seems that there was no deep

⁴⁹ CIPE Consultores and Project HOPE in Honduras and INDESUI in the Dominican Republic.

⁵⁰ US\$1,075,057 disbursed from a total of US\$1,343,268 contracted

⁵¹ US\$2,157,354 implemented, compared to US\$1,955,448 budgeted in the design.

⁵² Project Document, paragraph (19), page 5

participatory analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the project, which would have been needed in order to be able to design an exit strategy aimed at capitalizing the project's assets and solving its lacks.

| [202.](#) This perception is based on the fact that the evaluator did not learn of any formal document that includes probable activities for the local management structures to undertake after the end of the project, or proposals to resolve the technical and financial weaknesses of the micro-enterprises, among other aspects that should have been foreseen well in advance so as to be able to negotiate and formalize agreements with the interested entities.

| [203.](#) This omission, which is part of the design and the implementation, had little chance of being solved since the follow-up and evaluation systems did not have the goal of improving the actions and the results of the project. It is clear that a follow-up and evaluation system geared to the "management of results," plus accountability, would have made it possible to improve the results and to facilitate the timely preparation of an exit strategy.

3. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

204. This section presents the conclusions of the evaluation in a thematic order, including in all cases the corresponding recommendations and lessons learned.

205. It should be added that since this is an intervention whose first stage had already finished (Phase I) and whose extension is about to finish (Phase II), the recommendations for the project lack relevance because there will be no time to implement them. Instead, the lessons learned about the implementation are more valuable since they are addressed to IPEC and the participating governments in their projects, and there is the possibility of applying them to the design and implementation of future interventions. The issues identified by this evaluation are the following:

o OVERAL RESULTS OF THE PROJECT

206. This evaluation considers that the project, "Eradication of Child Labor in Commercial Agriculture in Central America and the Dominican Republic--Phase I" achieved most of its objectives and goals thanks to several strengths present in its implementation. It also had weaknesses in the design and implementation, which limited its achievements and the possibility for the participating countries to learn to design and implement their own projects to eradicate child labor.

207. The sustainability of the actions and effects is random because, although the local social mobilization is relevant—which is the basis of sustainability—the institutional and economic achievements were insufficient.

208. Among the strengths, the following stand out:

- i) Significant contribution to make the seriousness and dimension of child labor in agriculture visible in the sub-region, which had not been evident so far;
- ii) Withdrawal from labor and prevention of more children entering work than anticipated in the design;
- iii) Relevance of the project extension until August 2005;
- iv) Generation of very relevant local social mobilization processes to eradicate child labor in the intervention areas, with the greatest results in Azua and Chilascó, and less notable mobilization processes in Marcovia;
- v) Decisive participation of the employers' organizations of Marcovia and the trade unions in Azua in efforts to eradicate child labor;
- vi) Relevant increase in schooling and reduction of school failure in Chilascó and Azua;
- vii) Satisfactory coordination of the education and health activities in Chilascó;
- viii) Validation of an innovative income generation strategy in Marcovia, which consisted of training youngsters and adults for their insertion in the labor market;
- ix) Promising synergies that contributed to facilitating the exit of the project, which were aimed at deepening the effects and contributing to their sustainability.

209. The weaknesses are mostly attributable to the design; the most evident are the following:

- i) Design mode
- ii) Insufficient allocation of resources to the direct actions for the target population;
- iii) Insufficient co-funding of the project by the governments and other partners involved in the intervention area;
- iv) Lack of participation of public and private institutions of the countries in the direction and leadership of the project;
- v) The design not including the use of participatory methodologies in order to be able to focus the target group and to make the local civil sector aware of the child labor issue;
- vi) Limited efficiency of the implementation of the project;
- vii) Weak design and implementation of the income generation programs;
- viii) Weak design of the child-labor monitoring systems;
- ix) The failure to anticipate the need to systematize the experiences of the implementation so as to generate learning processes and management of the knowledge at the sub-regional level.

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o STRENGTHS

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▪ Visibilization of Child Labor in the Subregion

210. Child labor in commercial agriculture in Central America and the Dominican Republic was not considered a problem for two essential reasons. The first is that it was kept hidden or was minimized, and its existence was even denied. However, several actions of the project contributed to making it visible. Some of these efforts are the forums and workshops which were organized, and the participation in the project of the employers' organizations. Furthermore, there were numerous news articles about the project appearing in the newspapers with the highest circulation, and the publication and dissemination of documents, including those about the risks and negative effects of child labor.

211. The second reason is that part-time child labor carried out on the family's land parcel is considered as "formative work," that is, a kind of training which both transmits the family culture and that is a way to increase the family's income. In this regard, a popular saying in the Dominican Republic comes to mind as it reflects this cultural and economic situation:

A boy's work doesn't amount to much, but losing it is crazy.

212. Facing this cultural tradition was not a simple task, and both the awareness programs and the actions taken by the project coordination brought about a drastic change in the intervention areas, a reform that could be verified by this evaluation in the social mobilization generated.

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213. Therefore, it is concluded that the actions to make child labor visible have caused a significant increase in the social and institutional awareness about the negative consequences of child labor, and about the need to create programs and projects to eradicate it, these being results which have exceeded the project's expectations.

▪ Withdrawal and Prevention of Child Labor

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214. The relevant outcomes with respect to the eradication of child labor achieved in the intervention areas show, without any doubt, that the social protection measures and awareness actions undertaken were completely relevant.

215. Public and private institutions in the participating countries were also shown that, from the point of view of the characteristics of child labor, those projects which carry out actions in a uniform area are an adequate means for eradicating this form of exploitation, probably being more effective than large programs with nationwide coverage.

▪ Relevance of the Project's Extension

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216. The effects achieved between August 2003 and August 2005 fully justify the project's extension; otherwise, it would not have been possible for it to have completed its mission or to achieve many of the objectives.

217. This allows a lesson to be learned regarding the duration of future projects, since the design should adequately weigh the time required to produce the desired effects by placing special attention on the income generation efforts, and on education programs when they have the purpose of modifying the standard teaching methods.

▪ Local Social Mobilization

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218. The awareness actions of the project, both those which corresponded to the action programs and those carried out by the national coordination teams, gave rise to very relevant processes of local social mobilization intended to eradicate child labor, to enroll children in school, and to support the project's actions.

219. The notable success of the awareness actions was partly due to the establishment of participatory processes in which families could manifest their cultural traits and convictions. These

processes allowed the project to adjust its strategies to meet the expectations of the target population, and in this way it could facilitate the achievement of the expected effects.

220. In addition, these processes in turn gave origin to the parent and teacher committees that assumed the monitoring of child labor in order to detect new working children, children at risk, and children who were not attending school. The parent and teacher committees then later paid visits to families in order to raise their awareness about the issue of child labor.

221. This guarantees the sustainability of the actions and effects at the local level, at least in the short term. However, IPEC should appraise and capitalize on these social achievements by ensuring that these local organizations will continue to being visited regularly by IPEC national offices and by the technical units of the government departments that specialize in the eradication of child labor. If these kinds of actions are not implemented, there is a risk that these local organizations may become weaker and disappear due to changes in the families' lives and eventual migration.

▪ Employers' and Workers' Participation

222. The withdrawal and prevention of child labor achieved in Marcovia and Azua would not have been possible without the decisive participation of the employers who involved their human resources departments in the project's efforts to raise awareness and train parents, contractors, foremen, and technicians.

223. This all took place because in the areas with paid child labor, these are the people who, because of their particular interests, intervene and block efforts to withdraw children from labor and prevent them from working. Parents do so because they need the income generated by their children, contractors because children generate more profits for them, foremen and technicians because they have friendship ties and social commitments with the families, and because they believe that they are benefiting them by hiring their children.

224. However, in Marcovia at the beginning there were difficulties because employers felt attacked, and did not understand that the project was in fact benefiting their firms by protecting them from the sanctions that their exploiting child labor might bring about. This shows that the approach and awareness-raising should be done through entities and people that have employers' trust, as happened with the successful intervention carried out by COHEP in favor of the project.

225. FEINCAMAT's participation in Azua was also decisive. This is a closely-knit association of small producers, and it is an important decision-making entity in commercial agriculture, so its role was essential to raise its affiliates' awareness. Some of the achievements reached are partly due to its contribution.

226. Regarding the participation of workers' organizations, the project's experience shows that teacher unions and agricultural worker unions cannot be excluded from the project's actions and decision making.

227. All of this confirms the suitability of creating national direction entities for the projects. Such organizations should have with the participation of employers, workers, and the governments, as well as planning, approval, follow-up, and internal evaluation functions.

▪ Educational Achievements

228. The project demonstrated that ensuring that working children can learn, and reducing rates of school failure, are factors that are as important as enrolling them in school. Thus, the achievements in the reduction of school failure through the introduction of effective teaching methodologies, such as the Active Rural School (in Guatemala) and the homework rooms (in the Dominican Republic) signal a strategic orientation for the design of future projects.

229. This evaluation also understands that it is relevant to facilitate the incorporation of working children into school by using assistance measures, which may or may not be sustainable. But it is also believed that success in learning is more effective than these measures in order to be able to guarantee children's interest and families' enthusiasm about schooling. This is because the key notion is to prevent the frustration derived from having to repeat grades. It was also relevant to complement education with cultural and sports activities, because it allowed for expressing the potentialities of children and creating true enthusiasm among parents by their discovering their children's abilities.

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230. These elements indicate that the formulation and design of education programs should be innovative, and that such education programs have to explore alternatives that overcome the limitations and inefficiencies of traditional education.

▪ Coordination of the Health and Education Actions

231. The experience of the implementing agency Pastoral de la Niñez y la Salud in Chilascó leaves a valuable lesson for the project: health activities should be part of the education programs because this facilitates the coordinated implementation of the activities, and also guarantees an efficient delivery of the services.

232. The agency INDESUI in Azua tried to do the same, but the difficulties in reaching agreements with the Provincial Directorate of Health in Azua did not make it possible to attain the efficiency needed.

▪ Income Generation Strategy for Commercial Agriculture

233. The project had a positive and promising experience in generating income for the families who own no land in the commercial agriculture areas with a high demand for skilled labor. This experience took place in Marcovia, where youngsters and adults were trained to enter the job market. They found jobs immediately, without the usual difficulties that are inherent to the development of micro-enterprises. This is because the needed employment positions are available for those who have the required skills.

234. This experience leaves a lesson for IPEC, a lesson that deals with a deeper analysis of the income generation alternatives, and which will be able to give priority to those alternative that allow results to be obtained in the short-term, and that do not imply risks beyond the beneficiaries' capacity.

235. It is also recommended that CENET give priority to this line of training for labor insertion during the two-year period that CENET will work in Marcovia with the resources from the Advisory Council of the Poverty Reduction Strategy.

▪ Synergies and Exit Strategy of the Project

236. The project generated important synergies with national public and private entities that will contribute to the continuity of some efforts after it ends. This is the case of the extension of CENET's activities in Marcovia with resources from the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the possibility of Plan Internacional to continue implementing the same actions as the project did in Azua, but with its own funds, as well as the maintenance of the ARS methodology and the continuity of the Scholarships for Peace for students in the Mixed Rural School of Chilascó.

237. These synergies are a promising exit option of the project, because they try to consolidate the processes already started. However, they cannot be assessed properly as an exit strategy because they did not arise from an analysis of the participating parties or as a methodological process that guarantees their application.

238. Thus, the lesson is that future projects should give priority to the early preparation of an exit strategy with the participation of all parties involved, and that a methodology that guarantees compliance with this strategy should be used.

o WEAKNESSES

▪ Design Mode

239. The project was designed in two stages at different times. First, IPEC designed the sub-regional project and the national project, and then the implementing agencies designed the action programs.

240. This design mode is not completely relevant in this evaluator's opinion, because it is not clear what the roles of the NGOs are in the project. Are they expected to simply function as implementers

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or contractors of clearly defined action programs? Or, are they expected to make conceptual and methodological contributions to optimize their effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability?

241. In the first case, IPEC’s design should have included the action programs, while in the second, the design of the sub-regional and national projects should have been adjusted to adapt them to the terms and budgets of the action programs.

242. Thus, in the design of future projects, it is recommended that IPEC apply a consistent criterion that does not cause difficulties in the implementation mode.

▪ Insufficient Budgetary Allocation to the Direct Actions

243. The budget allocation amounted to US\$3.99 million⁵³ and included the project’s investments, per the following:

- Direct action programs⁵⁴ for the target group..... US\$ 1.86 mill. (47%)
- Child-labor monitoring US\$ 0.27 mill. (7%)
- Coordination (national and 75% Subregional) US\$ 1.85 mill. (46%)

244. This budgetary allocation is not adequate for such a project since the efficiency of the investment⁵⁵ made for the target group is insufficient (47%); additionally, a higher allotment should have been made for the direct action programs on the target population.

245. Although it is true that the coordination of a project with sub-regional coverage implies high costs due to the needs of the coordinating entities in the sub-region and the participating countries, it is also true that the project planning should have contemplated a higher efficiency of the coordination costs through an increase in the budget assigned to the direct actions for the target population. On the other hand, the operating of the monitoring systems and carrying out evaluations as a whole (follow-up of the activities and products, and ongoing evaluation of the effects) should not have had such high costs.

246. In this evaluator’s opinion, the budgetary allocation for the coordination of the project should not have exceeded 30%, while for the monitoring system and evaluation overall, it should not have exceeded 4% or 5%, thus becoming able to assign 65% of the total cost to the direct actions.

▪ Insufficient Co-funding from the Governments, Employers, and Workers

247. The funding expected in the design⁵⁶ amounted to US\$3.99 million. and included the following funding sources:

- USDOL US\$ 3.24 mill. (81%)
- National Governments... US\$ 0.62 mill. (16%)
- Other Partners US\$ 0.13 mill. (3%)

248. This distribution of the funds is not considered adequate because the amount contributed by USDOL was a donation to the countries to help them comply with the agreements signed with ILO⁵⁷ and their own legislation.

249. Moreover, a significant portion of the project’s investments was assigned to carrying out activities that are under the constitutional competence or jurisdiction of the governments, such as providing free elementary schooling. Thus, the necessary incentives for having access to this education, such as the scholarships granted and the food provided for children during the school day, should have also been considered an obligation of the State, given the condition of poverty of the project’s target group. On the other hand, these incentives are part of the social investment required to eradicate poverty.

250. Regarding the contribution of other partners, such as the agro-industrial employer organizations that illegally hired child workers, the project’s design should not have overlooked the

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⁵³ This total is the addition of the national projects’ budgets, including Broccoli in Chilascó, Melon in Marcovia, and Tomato in Azua, and 75% of the Sub-regional project. This total does not include the Basic Staples Project in Chontales and 25% of the Sub-regional project, as they are not evaluated here.

⁵⁴ Awareness, education, health, and income generation

⁵⁵ Measured as the investment percentage in the target population as compared to the total budget

⁵⁶ It corresponds to 75% of the Sub-regional coordination and the national projects—Broccoli in Chilascó, Melon in Marcovia, and Tomato in Azua

⁵⁷ Resolutions 138 and 182

fact that the intervention implies an evident benefit for these sectors, since it is helping them to comply with the national legislation now in force, and also because it is favoring the agro-industrial exports within the regulatory framework of the free trade agreements, such as DR-CAFTA, which prohibit child labor.

251. According to these factors, this evaluation considers that the design should have promoted financial contributions from the governments in amounts equivalent to the cost of providing first-quality education to the target group, including the necessary incentives for the families to send their children to school (uniforms, school supplies, and meals).

252. In the case of the agro-industrial employers, their contributions should have been proportional to the earnings derived from their exports, as well as to what they saved in avoiding payment of legal sanctions for hiring child workers.

253. An aspect that should also have been taken into account during the project's negotiation is the signing of agreements with national financial institutions to guarantee their contributions in cash and/or in kind.

▪ Lack of Participation of the Countries in the Project's Management

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254. The project design anticipated the creation of direction committees, but their nature and functions were not described. On the other hand, the project did not give enough importance to these committees, and preferred not to create them; instead, it used the institutional coverage of the National Commissions for the Eradication of Child labor. These commissions, composed of the highest ranking officers of the governments (ministers and vice ministers), may hardly participate in the direction of a project, nor it is appropriate to transfer the needed capacities for this function to them, because they will surely not exercise them.

255. Instead, it would have been suitable to create bodies integrated by intermediate level officials and specialized technicians in child labor, because they would have contributed to managing the project, and because they would have been transferred the necessary capacities to replicate the project under similar circumstances. It should be added that in some countries it would not have been necessary to create direction committees because there are already specialized technical units⁵⁸ that could have assumed the management functions of the project.

256. Thus, it is recommended for future projects that IPEC assign to these technical units the needed high-level management, or that it create direction committees comprised of intermediate level officers or technicians from the ministries of Labor, Education, Health, and Agriculture, as well as from the First Lady's Office, childhood institutes, technical training institutions, and national employers and workers' organizations. The technical secretary of these committees would be the project coordinator.

257. The functions of these units or committees could be: i) to technically approve the action programs; ii) to approve the annual plans; iii) to do follow-up on the project's implementation; iv) to attend the annual workshops for participatory evaluation; and v) to approve the annual internal evaluation.

258. The committees or technical units should meet at least three times a year, and keep a record of the issues discussed and meeting attendance figures.

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▪ Participatory Methodologies

259. The methodology proposed in the design to identify the target group was to carry out baseline studies. However, these studies only reflected the demographic and socioeconomic situation of the population, and identified children who were working at the time. They did not make it possible to calculate how the group of child workers would evolve as a result of the internal migrations that take place in the commercial agriculture areas.

260. On the other hand, the project expected to benefit the target group with social protection measures that included education, health, and income generation. However, all this was decided on without asking the population about these issues, and without knowing people's demands or those of

⁵⁸ Child Labor Unit of the Undersecretary of Labor of the Dominican Republic and the Technical Unit on Child Labor of the Labor Secretariat of Honduras; the latter is responsible for following up on projects for the eradication of child labor

the communities. This was a risk because they could have found a situation in which the target group did not accept these measures, and the project would have had serious difficulties in undertaking its actions.

261. Finding out the needs of rural poor communities is an obviously slow and complex task that does not correspond to the project design, since its function is to prepare a viable proposal adjusted to the overall strategy of the project. However, the design should have anticipated the creation of participatory diagnoses and planning processes to identify the demand, and to ascertain the changes that had taken place in the composition of the target group.

262. Although these participatory diagnoses and planning processes were not included, the project implementation established them in order to be able to find out what the demands of the target group were, and also to periodically check who the child workers and families were so as to focus on them. The participatory events undertaken in Chilascó included parents and teacher's meetings, through which they learned the reasons that families did not send their children to school. Among these reasons, they stated that they did not believe that teaching would be useful for the future performance of their children, who were frustrated because of the school failure. This finding allowed for meeting the demand of the beneficiaries of the project through the introduction of the teaching methodology known as Active Rural School (ARS), and this in turn made it possible to achieve the expected effects in the eradication of child labor and in children's schooling.

263. Something similar happened in Azua, where part of the awareness actions took place in community meetings in which the beneficiaries accepted the proposal of creating the homework rooms in order to reduce school failure and to generate an attractive use of children's spare time so as to prevent them from working on the plantations, as they included recreational, cultural, and sports activities.

264. In both cases, the participatory processes also originated very relevant social mobilizations that in part guarantee the sustainability of their effects. In addition, in both places, and derived from the participatory processes, community committees⁵⁹ were created to contribute to periodically updating the composition of the target group. It should be pointed out that these committees also evaluated the evolution of the target group in a rudimentary way by raising the awareness of new families.

265. These facts allow one to draw the following conclusion about the lesson learned for IPEC and the countries that implemented the projects for the eradication of child labor:

The social protection measures included in the design and the composition of the target group as established in the baseline studies should be adjusted through participatory processes of diagnosis, planning, and evaluation, as these processes could give rise to social mobilization dealing with child labor, as well as to sustainable community organizations that can assume a leadership position in these actions.

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▪ Efficiency of the Implementation

266. There were two elements that negatively impacted the project's efficiency: the unfortunate selection of three implementing agencies⁶⁰ that did not complete their action programs, and the delays in the approval of the programs until 2003⁶¹ which is why the time for project implementation doubled.

267. As a result of these difficulties, only 80% of USDOL resources contracted with the implementing agencies⁶² had been implemented by August 2005. On the other hand, the financial implementation of the national coordination efforts, and 75% of the sub-regional coordination, exceeded that which had been expected by 16%.

268. These differences meant a reduction of 15% in the investment efficiency given the increase of 0.35 dollars for the operation costs to invest 1.00 dollar for the target group, thus passing from the expected 1.15 dollars to 1.50 dollars.

⁵⁹ Surveillance committees of parents and teachers

⁶⁰ CIPE Consultores and Proyecto Hope in Honduras, and INDESUI in the Dominican Republic

⁶¹ From 2003 on, IPEC decentralized the technical approval, which reduced the delays in the approval.

⁶² US\$1,075,057 disbursed from a total contracted of US\$1,343,268.

269. The lesson that may be learned from these facts, and which IPEC may apply to future projects, is that:

In order to guarantee the efficiency of the investments made in the target population of the projects, the project should: i) optimize the selection of the implementing agencies through institutional diagnoses that evaluate their technical, administrative, economic, and financial capacity ii) guarantee the financial contributions of the governments and other partners by signing specific agreements.

Income Generation Programs

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270. The income generation programs were mostly aimed at the creation of micro-enterprises of production and/or commercialization, but the successful results obtained were not enough for several reasons.

271. The first reason was that they lasted a very short period (18 to 30 months), and it is not prudent to expect that in this brief period it would be possible to enter the markets and consolidate the micro-enterprises which are integrated by people with only just basic knowledge and experience, and very little capital. For this type of micro-enterprises, it would have been more realistic to provide at least 4 to 5 years of technical and financial assistance.

272. The second weakness was to assign insufficient budget in the design, which allocated US\$417,760 to assist 1,050 families, or US\$398 per family to provide training, technical assistance, non-refundable seed capital, and financing, an amount which is clearly insufficient.

273. Finally, the implementing agencies selected to implement these programs seem not to have enough capacity and experience in such a complex matter as promoting micro-enterprises, a task which requires solid knowledge of the market, business administration, and entrepreneurial management. In addition, the agency selected for Marcovia only recently started its activities in August 2004, with a gap of 30 months in comparison to the other programs.

274. Nevertheless, there were a few micro-enterprises providing services that were successful; among these business are those engaged in the production of *pilones* or seedlings raised to be transplanted, agricultural tourism, producing baked goods, blacksmith work and welding, carpentry, and marine motor repair. However, the lack of indicators about the income generation of the new micro-enterprises did not make it possible to objectively assess the success of the income generation programs.

275. Another promising line for the generation of income in non family-based commercial agriculture was that which was implemented by CENET in Marcovia, which consisted of training youngsters and adults for them to enter the labor market by taking into account the relevant demand for skilled labor in agro-industrial companies.

276. These problems leave two lessons for IPEC regarding the income generation programs of future projects. The first deals with the orientation of the programs:

The generation of income to eradicate child labor in areas with a large demand for skilled labor should be oriented to vocational training for labor insertion. When this demand does not exist, service micro-enterprises should then be promoted according to local demand, and as a last recourse, to create production and commercialization operations.

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277. Regarding the technical characteristics of the programs aimed at promoting micro-enterprises in production and commercialization, the lesson learned is that:

The income generation programs should be implemented by one or more agencies with solid experience in training, technical assistance, and financing that may continue to provide the service after the project ends. IPEC's resources should be used for non-refundable seed capital, and to pay for the program costs, but not to grant loans. Credit should be provided by other sources. The programs should also include indicators that allow the generation of income to be evaluated.

▪ Child-Labor Monitoring

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278. The objectives of child-labor monitoring were insufficient as they were only oriented toward reporting the progress of the project and the evolution of child labour in an area of the Project, without considering other aspects related with such evolution, to establish the effectiveness of the strategy adopted regarding the activities done and the products obtained.

279. Thus, there were some weaknesses that did not favor the child-labor monitoring operation, or its contribution to improving the project's strategies and actions. It is this evaluator's opinion that there were four elements that worked against the functionality of the system:

- a) The main effect indicator was the number of children detected on the plantations through periodic inspections. This indicator turned out to be very difficult to measure because of the broad extension of the lands, their multiple exits and entrances, and the ease with which the children were able to avoid being detected;
- b) Those responsible for measuring the indicators in the field were "monitors" who had been hired, with their transportation provided by the project. Occasionally, the monitors were accompanied by the local labor inspector, but frequently the inspector had to do other tasks essential to carrying out normal job duties, and so could not participate in measuring the indicators in the field. While the system operated according to the design guidelines, no other local human resources, such as parents, agro-industrial company staff, teachers, health promoters, or technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture participated. Thus, the operation cost was very high.
- c) There were no plans to use the information gathered in order to improve the project's management, and this is clearly evident in the fact that no events or activities for the use of this information were included. The result was that there was little interest in measuring the indicators and verifying the quality of the information on the part of the implementing agencies and the local organizations involved in the project.
- d) Nor was the system of interest to the ministries of labor that gather data about child labor through modules in the household, income, and consumption surveys, which, although less accurate, are adequate for the purposes of these institutions. These means of measurement are also more reliable because of the frequency with which they are used.

280. The above observations allows recommending to IPEC that the monitoring of the programs and the monitoring of child labour should be organized as follows:

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- a) The system should be uniform and standardized, and should include the monitoring of activities and outputs of the project, as well as the monitoring of child labour, most commonly known as continuous evaluation⁶³.
- b) The system's objectives should be clearly set forth, including how the information will be used in order to improve the project's management.
- c) The organization of the system should be defined, as well as the identity of all those who will participate in it; these aspects could be adjusted throughout the operation so as to be able to improve the effectiveness of the system.
- d) Within the system should be included those indicators that are easy to measure and a manual about these indicators should be prepared to standardize the measures;
- e) The measurement of the indicators should preferably be done by the local staff of the public and private sectors (labor inspectors, teachers, technicians in agriculture, health promoters, agro-industrial workers, and union affiliates); this would make it possible to reduce the costs, and to increase the interest of the entities involved in the projects.
- f) It is necessary to define the events for using the information gathered so as to be able to improve the project's management, to verify the quality of the information, and to favor the coordination of actions.
- g) Data recording and processing and the system coordination may be assigned as part-time work and may even be subcontracted, but it would be indispensable to appoint a person to be responsible of the monitoring and evaluation system in order to guarantee its operation and the preparation of the reports.

⁶³ Periodic measuring of impact indicators

▪ Learning and Knowledge Management

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281. The project has generated a valuable thematic and sub-regional experience about the eradication of child labor, experience which runs the risk of being lost when the staff and agencies stop working together.

282. There are also valuable experiences that have been gained related to national coordination and education, vocational training, and income generation programs, all of which are lessons learned by the project which can in turn be used by the participating countries in order to design and implement future projects.

283. Moreover, IPEC is part of the learning and management of knowledge through specific activities in many of its interventions; this is a valuable contribution for the countries so as to enable them to continue their actions to eradicate child labor.

284. Therefore, it is recommended that the project, through the sub-regional coordination teams, make an additional effort to systematize its most valuable experiences and to institutionalize the recommendations and lessons learned through the preparation of project design and implementation manuals for the eradication of child labor, this effort being carried out with the participation of all the parties involved.

285. The issues to systematize can be the experiences of the beneficiaries, such as the parents and teachers' committees of Chilascó, the surveillance committees of Marcovia, the micro-entrepreneurs and persons trained by the income generation programs, the educational experiences using innovative methodologies, the experiences of the employers and others in similar roles. The performance of the action programs may also be systematized in order to record the recommendations and lessons learned by the agencies and the project.

286. After concluding the systematization, national workshops should be organized with those involved in the project to prepare the manuals about the projects to eradicate child labor, to analyze the implications of the recommendations and lessons from the systematization efforts, and to formulate them as design and implementation norms. These manuals would be part of the institutional knowledge of the technical units related to child labor issues.

Annex 1: Revised Documentation

- Documento del Proyecto Subregional
- Documentos del Proyecto Nacional Brócoli en Guatemala
- Documentos del Proyecto Nacional Melón en Honduras
- Documentos del Proyecto Nacional Tomate en República Dominicana
- Evaluación de Medio Término del Proyecto – Diciembre/2002
- Evaluación Final del Proyecto – Agosto/2003
- Informes al Donante:
 - Setiembre/2003
 - Marzo/2004
 - Setiembre/2004
 - Marzo/2005
- Esquemas Sumarios, Contratos y Addenda de :
 - COOPEDEGUA
 - Municipalidad de Salamá
 - Pastoral de la Niñez y la Salud
 - Proyecto HOPE
 - CARE
 - CENET
 - Hábitat
 - INDESUI
 - Visión Mundial
- Reporte sobre el Trabajo Infantil en la Agricultura Comercial
- El Programa OIT-IPEC
- Trabajo Infantil en la Agricultura en Cifras
- Fichas de Seguridad y Salud del Trabajo Infantil Peligroso en Tomate, Brócoli, Melón, Café y Flores
- Cuatro Años Sembrando Esperanzas
- Sembrando un Mejor Futuro
- Ecos del Campo
- Manual para la Formación de Formadores en Trabajo Infantil Peligroso en la Agricultura”

Annex 2: Project Budget

Table 10. Asignación Presupuestaria de los Proyectos Nacionales
- en US\$ -

Proyecto	Componente / Programa de Acción	MONTO POR FINANCISTA			TOTAL	
		USDOL (US\$)	Gobierno (US\$)	Asociados (US\$)	US\$	%
Brócoli en Chilascó						
	Coordinación	232,860			232,860	19%
	Soporte y Contingencias	118,641			118,641	10%
	Línea de Base	25,000	2,000		27,000	2%
	Educación	84,370	391,181		475,551	40%
	Generación Ingresos	164,800		12,000	176,800	15%
	Salud	65,760	20,944		86,704	7%
	Sensibilización	19,400			19,400	2%
	Monitoreo del TI	66,925			66,925	6%
	Subtotal Proyecto Brócoli	777,756	414,125	12,000	1,203,881	100%
		65%		1%	66%	
Melón en Marcovia						
	Coordinación	221,790			221,790	26%
	Soporte y Contingencias	117,595			117,595	14%
	Línea de Base	15,000			15,000	2%
	Educación	154,900		35,000	189,900	23%
	Generación Ingresos	118,800			118,800	14%
	Salud	27,300		30,000	57,300	7%
	Sensibilización	24,900			24,900	3%
	Monitoreo del TI	90,615	2,880		93,495	11%
	Subtotal Proyecto Melón	770,900	2,880	65,000	838,780	100%
		92%		8%	100%	
Tomate en Azua						
	Coordinación	169,800		17,000	186,800	17%
	Soporte y Contingencias	136,305			136,305	12%
	Línea de Base	15,200		4,000	19,200	2%
	Educación	292,350	158,990	13,000	464,340	42%
	Generación Ingresos	118,160	2,000	2,000	122,160	11%
	Salud	29,640	11,500	2,000	43,140	4%
	Sensibilización	44,160	20,000	12,240	76,400	7%
	Monitoreo del TI	41,800	12,600		54,400	5%
	Subtotal Proyecto Tomate	847,415	205,090	50,240	1,102,745	100%
		77%		5%	81%	

Fuente: Elaboración propia con datos de los documentos del Proyecto

Table 11. Ejecución Presupuestaria del Proyecto

- en USD -

PROYECTO	CONCEPTO	AÑO						TOTAL							
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	US\$	%						
Proyecto Subregional	Expertos Internacionales							549,230	50%						
	Soporte Administrativo							97,615	9%						
	Gastos de Viajes							78,394	7%						
	Costo de Misiones							16,980	2%						
	Seminarios							65,719	6%						
	Equipo							53,514	5%						
	Operación/Mantenimiento							81,581	7%						
	Costo de Reportes							5,286	0%						
	Gastos Miscelaneos							33,997	3%						
	Gastos de Soporte							123,185	11%						
Subtotal Proyecto Subregional								1,105,501	100%						
Brócoli en Guatemala	Programas de Acción			96,384	20,538	40,745		157,667	18%						
	. Pastoral de la Niñez			20,000	116,253	43,177		179,430	20%						
	. Municipalidad de Salamá			16,568				16,568	2%						
	. COOPEDEGUA			19,779				19,779	2%						
	Línea de Base/Monitoreo			19,779				19,779	2%						
	Personal	47,623	39,641	72,530	89,754	25,833		275,381	31%						
	Capacitación	417	703	1,295	21,279	33,019		56,713	6%						
	Equipo	19,608				5,341		24,949	3%						
	Gastos diversos	5,219	11,165	9,737	10,019	12,933		49,073	6%						
	Gastos administración	9,473	25,292	26,648	26,954	11,745		100,112	11%						
Subtotal Brócoli en Guatemala								82,340	229,532	247,001	231,928	88,871	879,672	100%	
Melón en Honduras	Programas de Acción			20,000				20,000	3%						
	. CIPE Consultores			20,000				20,000	3%						
	. Proyecto HOPE			8,190	7,430	9,594		25,214	3%						
	. CENET					15,000	120,513	135,513	18%						
	. CARE Internacional					16,512	95,312	111,824	15%						
	Línea de Base/Monitoreo			15,000				15,000	2%						
	Personal	36,423	31,974	123,595	44,722	50,275		286,989	37%						
	Capacitación	534	188	1,324		4,000		6,046	1%						
	Equipo	6,563	14,188			1,150		21,901	3%						
	Gastos diversos	6,144	8,955	13,517	13,635	12,678		54,929	7%						
Gastos administración	6,456	10,854	19,580	12,809	41,334		91,033	12%							
Subtotal Melón en Honduras								56,120	109,349	165,446	112,272	325,262	768,449	100%	
Tomate en R. Dominicana	Programas de Acción			20,000	41,972	75,138	30,000	167,110	21%						
	. HABITAT			20,000	41,972	75,138	30,000	167,110	21%						
	. INDESUI			117,370	42,912	23,653		183,935	23%						
	. Visión Mundial						77,797	77,797	10%						
	Línea de Base/Monitoreo			7,980	7,980			15,960	2%						
	Personal	2,244	33,553	41,809	55,448	38,163	8,106	179,323	22%						
	Capacitación	319	963	325	1,238	13,448		16,293	2%						
	Equipo	10,613	20,161	673		6,524		37,971	5%						
	Gastos diversos	3,871	6,996	6,278	10,251	558		27,954	3%						
	Gastos administración	292	6,286	14,291	31,847	19,809	27,036	99,561	12%						
Subtotal Tomate en R. Dominicana								2,536	54,642	229,570	187,435	168,252	163,469	805,904	100%

Fuentes: Elaboración propia con datos contables de la Oficina Subregional IPEC